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Chapter 1
Overview
This dissertation consists of three essays studying the eects of an education policy and the
returns to schooling in Japan as an application of the recent developments in program evaluation
methods.
Policy makers and scholars broadly agree about the importance of the government’s role
in providing opportunities for investment in human capital. This applies to developing as well
as developed countries, the latter including Japan. Japan’s public investment in education in
recent years appears to reflect this idea; it has increased in line with the trends seen in other
member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
For example, OECD (2013) notes that public expenditure on educational institutions for all
levels of education in Japan increased by 5% between 2008 and 2010. However, if we were
to view it as a percentage of the gross domestic product, it accounts for only 3.6% compared
with the OECD average of 5.4% in 2010. This figure is the lowest among OECD countries
with comparable data (OECD, 2013). How much additional public investment is needed in the
education sector? Is there room to raise the eciency of existing education policies?
To evaluate the optimality of an education policy, estimating the eects of a policy or the
returns to education induced by a policy change is a central task for researchers. However,
the task becomes complicated if the eects are heterogeneous and people select their treatment
status based on own eects. The last two decades have seen a major development in the econo-
metric literature on program evaluation in terms of accounting for individual level heterogeneity
(Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001b).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, I define the treatment param-
eters of interest. Second, I briefly describe why such parameters cannot be estimated by the
conventional methods, such as ordinary least squares (OLS). Finally, I provide a short introduc-
tion of the tree essays.
1
1.1 Parameters of Average Treatment Eects
1.1.1 Setup
Let consider a framework that has two potential outcomes.1
Y1i if Di = 1 (1.1)
Y0i if Di = 0;
where Di denotes the treatment status for individual i that takes 1 if treated and 0 if not treated.
Y1i denotes a potential outcome for individual i if treated, and Y0i denotes a potential outcome
for individual i if not treated. The key issue of the policy evaluation is the fundamental problem
of causal inference (Holland, 1986). Using the notation 1.1, it can be written as,
Yi = DiYi1 + (1   Di)Yi0; (1.2)
where Yi is the observed outcome. The equation 1.2 implies that we only observe either Y1i
or Y0i, but not both states for each individual. This potential outcomes model is the Neyman-
Fisher-Cox-Rubin model in statistics (Fisher, 1935; Cox, 1972; Rubin, 1974; Neyman, 1990).
The model can be related to the structural model in the literature of economics, such as the
switching regression model introduced by Quandt (1972) and a type of Roy (1951) model that
Heckman and Honoré (1990) discuss the identification. A linear-in-the-parameters model with
a selection equation is an example,
Yi = Xi 0 + DiXi (1   0) + D(U1i  U0i) +U0i; (1.3)
where,
Y1i = Xi 1 +U1i (1.4)
Y0i = Xi 0 +U0i;
and,
Di = 1 i f Di  0;
= 0 otherwise
Di = D (Zi)   Vi; (1.5)
1Following discussion depends on Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999); Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005,
2007a,b); Blundell and Dias (2009).
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where, X and Z are observable characteristics of an individual i and (U1, U0, V ) are unobserv-
ables. In the following, the subscript i is omitted to simplify the notation. One interpretation of
the equation 1.5 is that,
D = D (Z )   V
= Y1   Y0   C(W )  UC
= X (1   0)   C(W ) + (U1  U0)  UC ; (1.6)
where, C(W ) and UC indicate some observable and unobservable costs respectively. The equa-
tion 1.6 represents that individuals select into treatment if sum of the observable net benefit:
D (Z ) = X (1   0)  C(W ) and the unobservable net benefit:  V = U1  U0  UC is positive.
1.1.2 Parameters of Interest
Now, let consider the conventional average treatment eects parameters that widely analyzed
in the literature of policy evaluation. Using the notation 1.1, these parameters are defined as
follows, the average treatment eect (ATE): E(Y1   Y0), indicates the average eect on the
population, the ATE on treated (ATT): E(Y1   Y0 jD = 1), indicates the average eect for the
subpopulation who selecting into treatment, and the ATE on untreated (ATU): E(Y1 Y0 jD = 0),
indicates the average eect for the subpopulation selecting no-treatment. In the third chapter, I
also consider the marginal treatment eect (MTE) introduced by Björklund and Mott (1987)
and Heckman and Vytlacil (1999),
MTE(V ) = E(Y1   Y0 jV = v):
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001b, 2005) show that the average eects parameters defined
above can be recovered as weighted averages of the MTE. Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001a)
prove that the local instrumental variable (LIV) identifies the MTE,
LIV =
@
@p
E[Y jP(Z ) = p];
where, P(Z ) denotes the probability of participation in the treatment or the propensity score.
The LIV represents a limit form of the local average treatment eect (LATE) proposed by
Imbens and Angrist (1994),
LATE =
E[Y jZ = z]   E[Y jZ = z0]
P(z)   P(z0 )
= E[Y1   Y0 jD(z) = 1;D(z0 ) = 0]: (1.7)
3
The equation 1.7 indicates the average eect for those who are induced to change their treatment
status from no-treatment: D(z
0
) = 0 to treatment: D(z) = 1 by a discrete change in the value
of Z , such that from z
0
to z.
1.2 Biases in the Conventional Method
In this section, I discuss that what type of biases the OLS estimates include when estimating the
ATE parameters. Using the equations 1.1 and 1.2, I consider the following regression model,
Y = Y0 + D(Y1   Y0): (1.8)
If I assume that  = 1 = 0 and suppress X to simplify the equation 1.3, the equation 1.8 is
equivalent to the following simple regression model,
Yi =  + iDi +U0i
=  + Di +  i; (1.9)
where, i = U1i  U0i and  i = (i   )Di +U0i.
The equation 1.8 implies that the OLS estimates equal estimating the dierence E[Y jD =
1]   E[Y jD = 0]. Due to the fundamental problem of causal inference, we can only observe
E[Y1 jD = 1] and E[Y0 jD = 0] from the data, therefore,
E[Y jD = 1]   E[Y jD = 0] = E[Y1   Y0 jD = 1] + (E[Y0 jD = 1]   E[Y0 jD = 0]) (1.10)
= E[Y1   Y0] + (E[Y1   Y0 jD = 1]   E[Y1   Y0])
+ (E[Y0 jD = 1]   E[Y0 jD = 0]): (1.11)
The equation 1.10 indicates that if the ATT is the targeted parameter, the OLS estimate
includes the bias: E[Y0 jD = 1]   E[Y0 jD = 0], which is a selection bias. The equation 1.11
shows that if the ATE is the targeted parameter, the OLS estimate also includes the bias: E[Y1  
Y0 jD = 1]   E[Y1   Y0], which is the sorting gain suggested in Heckman and Vytlacil (1999,
2001a, 2005). A positive sorting gain is the benefit for those who select into treatment because
they expect their higher gain than the average. For example, in the equation 1.9, it implies that
i >  in  . It is not natural to assume that the biases are zero if individuals self-select their
treatment status based on own eects, such as schooling decisions. This suggests the necessity
of using a program evaluation method to estimate the parameters of policy interest.
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1.3 Introduction of the Essays
In this section, I introduce the three essays in the following chapters. These essays intend to
estimate the causal eects of education in Japan, allowing for people self-select their treatment
status based on their heterogeneous eects. The essays deal with levels of education from the
compulsory schooling to the intergenerational transmission.
In the second chapter, I investigate how the reduction of instructional time aects educa-
tional attainment, using the revision of the Japanese curriculum standards in 1981 as a quasi-
experiment. Although instructional time is considered an important input for the education
production function, there is limited consensus on its causal eect on later outcomes. This is
because of the diculty of estimation without relying on cross-country variation or on before-
and-after comparison. By using a feature of the centralized Japanese public educational system,
this study estimates the eect of the revision in junior high schools as a dierence-in-dierences
estimator. The revision is unique because it reduces the total school teaching hours by 445,
which corresponds to about 13% of the previous standards, leaving the length of school weeks
or the educational system unchanged. The main results show that the revision decreases school-
ing by about 0.5 years and the probability to enroll in high school by about 3 to 4% for women.
These results are statistically significant and robust to controlling for the birth cohort or regional
eects.
The third chapter examines the returns to university education in Japan using tuition, avail-
ability of universities, and labor market conditions as instruments. The magnitude of the returns
to schooling has been a long lasting research interest of economists from Becker (1975), Becker
and Chiswick (1966), and Mincer (1974). The returns to schooling have been estimated using
data from many countries and time periods, and previous studies have found that schooling
has significant impacts on a lot of grounds of later outcomes.2 However, estimating the causal
eects of education is not a simple task since the decision on an additional schooling is en-
dogenously determined based on the individual level heterogeneity. One way to deal with the
endogenous schooling decision is to use the IV approach. In this study, a set of education policy
relevant instruments allows estimating the marginal eects for individuals who are induced to
enroll in university by dierent marginal policy changes. Using the estimated MTE, this paper
recovers the ATE parameters. The main empirical result shows that an additional year of univer-
sity education increases the hourly wage by about 6.74% for the population. This study further
finds that policies increasing the probability of university enrollment, such as free tuition and an
increase in local capacities of universities, bring about positive eects of university education.
Finally, in the fourth chapter, I study the intergenerational eects of education in Japan, us-
ing a nonparametric bounds approach. The educational levels of parents are considered as key
2For example, Card (1999) provides a comprehensive survey for pecuniary outcomes. See also Oreopoulos and
Salvanes (2011) for a survey of eects on non-pecuniary outcomes. Eide and Showalter (2011) provide a survey
for the recent studies of the relation between health and education.
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factors in explaining their child’s educational success. Empirical studies of social science have
long been interested in quantifying the magnitude of the relation, and they have often found
a significant positive correlation between the parents’ and child’s schooling. Unfortunately, a
positive intergenerational correlation does not necessarily reflect a causal relation. If the iden-
tification assumption on the exogenous selection of treatments is not valid, the OLS estimates
provide a biased magnitude of the causal eect. Rather than imposing the strong assumptions
required to obtain point estimates, this study derives bounds depending on relatively weak semi-
monotonicity assumptions on treatment response, selection, and IVs. A combination of these
three assumptions provides informative bounds on the ATE of parents’ schooling on the child’s
schooling. The main results show that the tightest lower bounds suggest positive causal eects
of parents’ schooling, but the tightest upper bounds on the eects are lower than the point esti-
mates that rely on the assumption of exogenous selection of parents’ schooling. These results
suggest that simple regression overestimates the true causal eect of parents’ education.
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Chapter 2
The Eect of Instructional Time
Reduction on Educational Attainment:
Evidence from the Japanese Curriculum
Standards Revision
2.1 Introduction
The publicly provided schooling at the compulsory education stage assures all children of an
opportunity to learn fundamental knowledge or skills that aect their later life outcomes. As
prior researches show, accumulating human capital at the earlier stages is more significant for
higher educational achievement.1 Moreover, additional schooling improves both pecuniary and
non-pecuniary outcomes in adulthood.2 Therefore, a useful educational system or policy has
long been an interest of parents, educators, and policy makers, as well as economists. The
classroom instructional time is one of the important educational factors with policy relevance,
since it is more cost eective and simpler to change time allotment than to reform an entire
educational institution.
Although there have been numerous studies about the eect of time spent in school on later
achievement since the seminal paper of Card and Krueger (1992), evidence of the causal eect
of instructional time itself is still limited. Because school time inputs are usually determined
endogenously, it is dicult to control for an unobserved heterogeneity that correlates to the
instructional time and outputs. Consequently, previous studies depend on cross-regional or
1See Cunha et al. (2006) as an example.
2For example, see Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), Harmon and Walker (1995), Oreopoulos (2006) for earnings
Lochner and Moretti (2004) for criminal activities, Lleras-Muney (2005) for mortality rate, and Oreopoulos (2007)
for subjective well-being.
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cross-country variations of instructional time to estimate the eects.3 Furthermore, most of
these studies examine the impact of time on test scores, and less is known about the eects on
later outcomes, which are arguably a greater concern.
Recent studies overcome this potential endogeneity problem of the length of school time by
using educational system reform as a quasi-experiment. This study estimates the eect of a re-
duction of instructional time in Japan using the revision of the compulsory curriculum standards
as a quasi-experiment. Among the significant relevant literature, Meghir and Palme (2005) and
Pischke (2007) are the most closely related to this study, and are also valuable representatives
of policy evaluation studies that directly estimate the treatment eect of compulsory schooling
law reform as a dierence-in-dierences (DID) estimator.
Meghir and Palme (2005) use an expansion of compulsory schooling from 7 to 9 years in
Sweden. The reform began from 1949 and was implemented gradually by municipality level.
After the reform, the academic grades-based selection at the junior secondary school admis-
sion was abolished, enabling students to choose from one of three new courses in the same
school, and the curricula were consolidated into one national curriculum. Meghir and Palme
(2005) show that in the entire sample analysis, the revision significantly increases additional
post-compulsory schooling by about 3% and years of schooling by 0.298 years. It is worth
noting the larger eects they find for women. In the sub-sample analysis of women, the re-
form significantly increases additional post-compulsory schooling by about 5% and years of
schooling by 0.339 years, clearly statistically significant eects.
Pischke (2007) shows the eect of short school years in the transition period for the reform
that changed the start season of an academic year from spring to autumn in 1960s Western
Germany. The short school years only aected the length of instructional weeks, but did not
directly influence the highest grade completed or the curriculum. He reveals that about one-third
reduction of instructional weeks per year for two school years significantly increases a grade
repetition in primary education. In the census data analysis, the reform decreases total years
of education by about 0.3 years, but he suggests that the eect on the years of education stems
from the reduction of students who chose the longer academic track of secondary education.
Although a large number of researches in the literature estimated the eect of compulsory
educational policy reforms, there are very few empirical studies that examine such an eect in
Japan using individual data.4 One of the exceptions is that by Kawaguchi (2011). He analy-
ses the eect of a reduction of school days using a policy reform that changed all Saturdays
to school holidays from 2002 in Japan. Using a Japanese time use survey, Kawaguchi (2011)
shows that the reform reduces the studying time of junior high school students, and the eects
are larger for those with less-educated parents. He also reveals this increased gap of studying
3For example, see Lee and Barro (2001), Wößmann (2003), Lavy (2010). Lavy (2010) also estimates the eect
in Israel with the fixed eects approach. See Hanushek (2003) for a survey for the eects of school inputs.
4Oshio and Seno (2007) provide a survey of empirical studies in the economics of education using Japanese
data.
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time results in a widening gap in test scores among dierent parental education backgrounds.
However, Kawaguchi (2011) only depends on the before-and-after policy change for the iden-
tification. Generally, a policy reform is implemented nationwide simultaneously, so that it is
dicult to evaluate the eect without relying on before-and-after comparisons that may include
other policy eects or macro-aggregate trends. One contribution of this study is that it estimates
the eect of nationally provided educational regulation change as a DID estimator by using a
feature of the centralized Japanese educational administration system.
In Japan, materials taught and teaching hours at elementary and secondary schools are reg-
ulated by the curriculum standards (Gakushu shido yoryo) issued by the Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), under the regulation of the School Educa-
tional Law (Gakko kyoiku ho shiko kisoku). Therefore, it is mandatory for all public schools
to implement a uniform curriculum. The standards have been revised eight times from 1947 to
2012, with the fifth revision significantly reducing standard teaching hours because the previous
curriculum was considered to have too much instructional time. However, private schools are
not obligated to obey the standards and therefore, the eects of revision are limited to public
schools.
This study analyses the greatest change in junior high school. The revision reduced school
teaching hours overall by 445, which corresponds to about 13% of the previous standards. A
principal reduction was implemented in the four compulsory subjects and one semi-compulsory
elective subject (foreign languages), that were subjects of the entrance examinations in general.
I estimate the eects of the standards revision on public school graduates through the DID
method using private school graduates to capture the upward trend of educational attainment.
The results show that the reduction of the instructional time decreases the years of schooling by
about 0.5 years and the probability of upper secondary school enrollment by about 3 to 4% for
women.
This study is the one of the first studies that estimates the causal eects of instructional time
change caused by a reform of compulsory schooling regulations on later outcomes in Japan.5
This study also contributes to the literature by evaluating a curriculum reform that changed total
instructional time without changing the main source of variation in the previous studies such as
school seasons, the length of school weeks, and educational systems.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 1981 Japanese
curriculum standards revision. Section 3 and 4 explain the data and the estimation method,
respectively. Section 5 shows and discusses the results. Section 6 presents a robustness check
of the main results. Finally, Section 7 presents the conclusions.
5Oshio et al. (2010) analyze the subjective evaluation of a curriculum revision by parents. Nakamura (2011)
also considers the same revision and data that this study uses. In the estimation, with implicit additional assump-
tions that private schools equally reduced expected teaching hours and that there was no transition period, he shows
that the eect on educational attainment for public school graduates is smaller for women who lived in a prefecture
that had a government-ordinance-designated city (seirei shitei toshi).
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2.2 The 1981 Curriculum Standards Revision
Since 1947, the Japanese School Education Act (Gakko Kyoiku Ho) has implemented a nine-
year compulsory schooling period,6 consisting of a six-year elementary (primary) school period
and a three-year junior high (lower secondary) school period. After completing compulsory
schooling, students can attend a three-year (senior) high school or a five-year technical college
(Koto senmon gakko) for upper academic secondary education. High school graduates can
enroll into a four-year college (university) or a two-year junior college for higher education.
For technical college graduates, entering into the third grade at university is another option in
addition to the high school graduates’ choices. A Japanese school year basically begins in April
and is completed in March.
Japanese academic schools are established as public (national; koku-ritsu and municipal; ko-
ritsu) and private (shi-ritsu) schools.7 For admission into a post-compulsory school, students
are required to pass an entrance examination, such as a paper-based test in the subjects of study
or an interview. To enter national or private elementary and junior high schools, it is necessary
to pass a selective examination. Entrance examinations are basically administered by each
institution.8 For municipal high schools, each municipality provides an entrance examination.
In Japan, a school admission is mainly determined by performance on entrance examinations.
The performance in a former school and extracurricular activities are less considered in the
admission process.
The curriculum standards (the course of study; Gakushu sido yoryo) are curriculum guide-
lines for teaching issued by the MEXT. The standards specify materials taught with the amount
of instructional time for all subjects for elementary, junior high and high schools. The standards
are enforced under the School Education Law (Gakko kyoiku ho shiko kisoku). The ministry
also publishes a supplemental commentary to the curriculum standards (Gakushu sido yoryo
kaisetsu) that prescribes the materials taught, the method of teaching and the instructional time
in detail.9
Even though the curriculum standards were revised eight times from 1947 to 2012, the strict
provisions provided almost no room for discretion of teachers and schools until the time for in-
tegrated studies (Sogo-teki na gakushu no jikan)were regulated in the 2002 revision. Especially,
the former standards of the fifth revision were considered the so-called “cramming education”
6In Japan, the period of compulsory schooling is defined by school years, not by age.
7Municipal schools are schools established by a municipality, such as city, town and village. Municipal schools
also contain prefecutural schools and schools established by an agency of a local government.
8Public and some private universities also require applicants to take a national standardized test as a preliminary
examination.
9The commentary is not legally binding in nominal.
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(tsumekomi kyoiku), wherein the educational contents or the amount of instructional time were
too much. This excessive quantity of teaching hours gave an opportunity for substantial instruc-
tional time reduction in the fifth standards revision in 1981, which this study analyses.
The fifth revision of the curriculum standards for elementary and junior high school was
announced in 1977 after the Central Council for Education had proposed a reduction of the
contents of learning in 1976. Since the fifth revision, the ministry has provided a transition
period for new standards. In the transition period from the 1978 school year to the school year of
full implementation, the new standards were carried out in stages for students who had already
enrolled. The full implementation started from the 1980 school year in elementary schools and
from the 1981 school year in junior high schools. In the revision, the biggest change was made
in the junior high school standards. In the following, I describe the unchanged and changed
aspects of the junior high school standards.
First, I explain the unchanged points. There are three main unchanged points. First, the
number of standard annual school weeks remained as 35 weeks. Second, the class unit time
was kept as 50 minutes. The unchanged schooling term and class unit time guaranteed that
the revision only influenced the educational contents and the instructional time, but not the
fundamental educational systems or the school seasons. Third, the total number of teaching
hours for art, music, and moral education was also unchanged. This suggests that the revision
basically reduced the time for the main subjects that were subjects of the entrance examination
and thus strongly related to later educational achievement.10
Second, I describe the changed parts. The fifth revision substantially reduced the amount
of standard instructional time for all the junior high school years (Table 1). The total reduction
in school hours over three years was 385 class units (from 3,535 to 3,150 units), that is, by
about 11% of the last standards’ total school hours. The school teaching hours were reduced
by 445 class units (from 3,385 to 2,940 units), which corresponded to about 13% of the last
standards’ total teaching hours and were equivalent to more than 120 hours of reduction per
grade.11 Moreover, about 70% of the total reduction was made in the main four subjects and an
elective subject (foreign language).12
As I explained above, there was a large reduction of the total instructional time in the fifth
standards revision. However, this regulation change was only limited to public junior high
schools, and private junior high schools did not have to observe the revision.13 This quasi-
10The main subjects are Japanese language, mathematics, science, and social studies.
11The school teaching hours are school hours excluding hours for special activities. The hours of special activi-
ties are time for extracurricular activities, such as home room activities and school events.
12Students could choose one subject from English, French and German as a foreign language.
13The legal extent of the curriculum standards is unclear. Since 1958, the Minister of Education has promulgated
the curriculum standards. The legal binding force of the standards to the public schools was confirmed by the
Supreme Court judgment of the administrative disposition cancellation (the so-called “Denshu high school teacher
disciplinary dismissal”) incident in 1990. However, the judicial precedent did not provide any interpretation of the
legal binding force for private schools, and thus it is possible to consider that the standards legally do not aect
private schools. Therefore, many private schools are considered to be not according to the standards, but an exact
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experimental situation provides an opportunity to quantify the eect of instructional time re-
duction on final educational achievement.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 The Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers
A data set that can be used to estimate the causal eect in this study must have two essential
properties. First, it must include information on the respondent’s completed schooling attain-
ment. Second, it must include information on the establishment type of the junior high school
from which the respondent graduated. This study uses the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers
(JPSC) by the Institute for Research on Household Economics. The JPSC has surveyed a na-
tionwide representative sample of women every year since 1993. The survey began with 1,500
women aged between 24 and 34 years in 1993 (Cohort A). Samples were expanded with 500
women aged 24 to 27 years in 1997 (Cohort B), and 836 women aged between 24 to 29 years
in 2003 (Cohort C).14 Until today, the surveys are conducted between October 1 and October 31
every year. From the JPSC, I make a pooled cross-sectional data set with the first time survey
of these three cohorts A, B, C, as randomly sampled three cross-sectional data sets.
In the JPSC, I can identify that the respondent graduated from a public or a private junior
high school. This is an advantage that only the JPSC has, as other individual data available
in Japan do not include information about the establishment type of school from which the
respondent graduated. Unfortunately, in the analysis data, I am unable to dierentiate between
national school graduates and municipal school graduates because the data set contains only
two types of responses regarding the establishment type of junior high schools: Public (national
and municipal) or Private. Hence, the analysis data include both national and municipal school
graduates under public junior high school graduates.
National junior high schools are subject to the curriculum standards but are also aliated
to a faculty of a national university and play an important role in the research on educational
science and teaching practices. For example, a national junior high school aliated to a faculty
of education could oer a class on developing or practicing an experimental teaching method. It
may aect the magnitude of eects of the revision on national junior high school graduates and
bias the estimates of the treatment eects. However, I assume that the bias from the inclusion of
national junior high school graduates is limited because the proportion of national junior high
school students is very small. According to the School Basic Survey, an ocial statistical report
published by the MEXT, the proportion was less than 1% of all junior high school students.
enforcement situation is not certain.
14In the JPSC, information for men is also available as husband information for women who got married. How-
ever, I do not use this data set for men since the male respondents are not randomly sampled.
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The JPSC also includes information about family background including the number of sib-
lings, the level of the last school attended by the father and mother, the father’s occupation, and
the prefecture where the respondent spent the longest period of time during compulsory edu-
cation.15 Other available information includes whether the respondent attended a cram school
(juku) in addition to the regular school education.16
For the outcome variable, this study considers years of schooling, additional schooling as
measured by binary outcomes (whether the respondent enrolls in a university, i.e. a four-year
college, and whether the respondent has some schooling beyond the compulsory level). Since I
am unable to obtain the years of schooling directly from the JPSC, I therefore assign a general
number of education years to each degree and reduce the general years by one year for those
who dropped out before finishing their last school.17
However, the JPSC has the following five limitations: (1) it has no information about the
parent’s past income; (2) the sample size is significantly small compared to the previous studies
that used census or other administrative data; (3) it does not include questions about the indi-
vidual’s abilities, for example, academic performance or IQ score, which are included in the
analysis of Meghir and Palme (2005); (4) it does not identify the respondent’s exact birth month
and year; and 5) the available information about paternal occupation does not always reflect the
occupation at the time the respondent was in junior high school. I explain these five limitations
in more detail below.
First, the income of parents has a correlation to expenditures outside the school and is also
important information from the perspective of budget constraints on the decision of undertaking
additional schooling. However, Meghir and Palme (2005) and Pischke (2007) also do not con-
trol for the parental income, but instead control for the number of years of parental education. I
follow this substitution.
Second, I am unable to cope with the issue of small sample size because the JPSC is the
only individual data set that includes information on the establishment type of the respondent’s
junior high school.
Third, in Japan, before the national achievement test held in 2007, there was no uniform
criteria-based national academic indicator for students under the secondary educational level.
In addition, students had no obligation to take an IQ test. Therefore, this analysis is unable to
15The father’s occupation is his current occupation if he has not yet retired or his previous occupation otherwise.
No information is available for maternal occupation.
16The cram school attendance also includes the usage of private tutoring because the data set does not dieren-
tiate using a cram school from using a private tutoring.
17The general number of education years is 9 years for junior high school graduates, 12 years for high school
graduates, 14 years for junior college or technical college graduates, 16 years for university graduates, and 18 years
for graduate school graduates. However, because of the form of the questions about parents in the JPSC, I assign
16 years for graduate school in the parental years of schooling variable. In addition, parental degree of education
in Cohort A includes drop outs. The results with an alternative definition of parental education are provided in the
section for the robustness check. If a respondent was a student on the survey date, I assume she completed the
degree. When I assume such a respondent is a drop-out, the main results are basically same.
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control for the respondent’s abilities and might include the so-called ability bias. However, in
Section 2.4.2, I show that there is no ability bias caused by a systematic movement of potential
new students between public and private junior high schools.
Fourth, the JPSC only asks about the age on October 1 in each survey year. Therefore,
I must calculate the birth year as ‘the year for each survey   the answered age’.18 To avoid
misclassification by the incomplete birth year information, this study limits the sample used for
analysis. I describe the sample restriction method in detail in the following section with the
classification of the age (birth year) groups that were aected by the standards revision.
Fifth, the problem regarding the father’s occupation information also stems from a ques-
tion item of the JPSC. The JPSC asks about the current father’s profession if the father is still
working at the time of survey, whereas it asks about the past occupation (when he was working)
if he has already retired. Thus, the available occupational information may not correspond to
the father’s job when the respondent was in junior high school. In particular, if an investment
decision on the children’s education aects the father’s retirement decision, the paternal retire-
ment timing is not random, and thus, the information on father’s occupation in the JPSC is not
appropriate for use in the analysis. However, since the JPSC has little information about home
attributes, this study includes the father’s occupation as a control variable for a robustness check
and shows that there is no significant dierence in the results.
2.3.2 Sample Restriction
This section explains the sample restriction. The two problems observed in sample restrictions
are (1) transition period of the new curriculum standards and (2) classification of treatment
cohorts by the guessed birth year. I take the following steps to restrict the sample. First, I
exclude the individuals who were junior high school students during the transition period based
on the nominal entrance school year. Second, I restrict the sample to adjust the misclassification
caused by the guessed birth year.
This study estimates the eects of the fifth revision that was fully implemented from the
1981 school year, and thus needs two groups to analyze. One is the ‘before-revision group’ who
have completed three years of junior high school under the last curriculum standards. Another
is the ‘after-revision group’ who have enrolled after the fifth revision and were completely
influenced by the new standards for all three years. The JPSC includes individuals who were
born from 1959 to 1979. In Japan, students enter junior high school in April in the school year
in which they turn 13 years old. Therefore, students who were born after April 1968 enrolled in
junior high school after the full implementation of the new curriculum standards.
However, as explained in Section 2.2, the new curriculum standards were partially in eect
under the transition period from the 1978 school year. The implementation during the transition
18Hereinafter, I call this calculated birth year as the ‘guessed birth year’.
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period is not clear because each prefecture, municipality, or school had dierent treatment situ-
ations. Based on this concern, I exclude the respondents who were born in 1963 and 1967 from
the analysis sample, because these cohorts attended junior high schools during the transition
period and partially received the treatment. Similarly, I drop the individuals who were born
after 1975 from the analysis sample because people in these birth year groups were junior high
school students during the transition period of the sixth revision of the curriculum standards
announced in 1989. Ultimately, following the sample restriction, the before-revision group in-
cludes individuals born from 1959 to 1962, and the after-revision group includes those born
from 1968 to 1974.
In the next step, I restrict the sample because the JPSC has no accurate information on the
birth month and birth year. The JPSC only asks about the age on October 1 in each survey year
but does not ask the exact birth month and year. Therefore, the guessed birth year calculated
as “year for each survey   answered age” includes women who were born from October 2 to
December 31 in the year previous to the guessed year in addition to those born from January 1
to October 1 in the precisely calculated year.19
I do not include women who guessed 1959 and 1968 as birth years in the analysis. The
guessed 1959 birth year cohort also includes women who were born before March 1959. These
women attended junior high school under the same standards as those who were born in the
1958 school year (April 1958 to March 1959). The 1958 birth year cohort studied for only two
years under the standards that were in force from 1972, and their total instructional time was
less than the amount for the before-revision group. The before-revision group studied for all
three years under the 1972 standards, which had the longest instructional time. Similarly, I drop
women who guessed 1968 as the birth year from the analysis sample because they were under
a dierent treatment condition. Women from the 1967 birth year group received junior high
school education only for two years after the full implementation of the 1981 standards.
Based on the above sample restrictions, the analysis sample includes women who enrolled
before the revision, that is, years 1960 to 1962, and who enrolled after the revision, that is, 1969
to 1974 for the guessed birth year.
19For example, if a woman answered her age was 33 years on the Cohort A survey in 1993, the guessed birth
year is calculated as “1993   33 = 1960”. These 33 year-old respondents also include women who were born in
1959. For example, a woman who was born on October 2 in 1959 was still 33 years old on the survey date of
October 1 in 1993.
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2.4 Estimation Method
2.4.1 Estimation Model
To estimate the eect of the instructional time reduction by the curriculum standards revision,
this study follows Meghir and Palme (2005) and Pischke (2007), and uses the DID method. I
estimate an equation of the form:
yi =  + Di + A f teri + Publici + Xi + !t + r +  i
where yi is the outcome, Di is a dummy variable indicating the treatment status (i.e. Di =
Publici  A f teri), Publici indicates those who graduated from a public junior high school,
A f teri indicates those who enrolled in a junior high school after the standards were revised,
Xi control for the observable characteristics of an individual (mother’s and father’s years of
schooling, number of siblings, and a set of paternal job dummies),20 and !t ; r are sets of
dummies capturing the birth year cohort and regional eects.21  i is the unobservable error
term. , the coecient of Di, provides the treatment eect of interest.
This model is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) for years of schooling, with
the probit model for the discrete educational outcomes. In computing the standard errors, I
allow for arbitrary correlation among public/private and birth year cohorts. To estimate the
average treatment eect on treated (ATT) as the DID estimator with pooled cross-sectional
data, for which the identification relies on the following two assumptions: both of them are
under conditional on observed characteristics, (1) in the absence of the revision, the changes in
the average outcomes of the public graduates and the private graduates would have followed a
common trend before and after the revision; (2) there is no systematic movement of students
between the treatment and the control group. Although, the assumption cannot be tested directly
in general, this study partially tests the assumption that is most critical using an external data
set.
20Father’s job categories are defined as follows: (1) Agriculture, Forestry or Fishery, (2) Commercial, Industrial
or Service business of small size, (3) Management, Freelance professional, Other professional, and Teacher, (4)
Technical employee or Skilled employee, (5) Clerical employee, Sales and Service employee, and (6) Pay job at
home, Without occupation, and Don’t know or Missing.
21Based on the geographic location, I divide 47 prefectures into 11 regions: (1) Hokkaido, (2) Tohoku (Aomori,
Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, Yamagata, Fukushima), (3) Kita-Kanto (Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama), (4) Minami-
Kanto (Chiba, Kanagawa, Yamanashi), (5) Tokyo, (6) Hokuriku and Shinetsu (Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui,
Nagano), (7) Tokai (Gifu, Shizuoka, Aichi, Mie), (8) Kinki (Shiga, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara, Wakayama),
(9) Chugoku (Tottori, Shimane, Okayama, Hiroshima, Yamaguchi), (10) Shikoku (Tokushima, Kagawa, Ehime,
Kochi), and (11) Kyushu and Okinawa (Fukuoka, Saga, Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Oita, Miyazaki, Kagoshima, Oki-
nawa).
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2.4.2 Assumption for the Identification and Its Validity
This section discusses the validity of the assumption described in Section 2.4.1. A critical
assumption for estimating the ATT parameter with pooled cross-sectional data is that there is
no compositional change in the groups before and after the revision. Put it in another way,
I assume that there is no intentional movement of potential students from public junior high
schools to private junior high schools after the fifth revision of standards. For example, if
a potential public junior high school student who had superior abilities or education-oriented
parents transferred her from a public junior high school to a private junior high school, this
provides an overly estimated treatment eect.
I confirm the validity of the assumption in three ways. First, I compare the parental years
of schooling of public school graduates with those of private school graduates. The assumption
implies that the relative achievement or abilities of private school students compared to those
of public school students did not change in the later cohort. Unfortunately, data on abilities
or skills, which are factors influencing potential outcomes, are not available and these are thus
unobservable. Therefore, I use parental education as a proxy because, in general, parental
education and children’s unobservable abilities are highly correlated. If a systematic movement
between public and private groups was caused by the revision, it also changed the distribution
of parental education. Second, I check the time series trend of the enrollment rate of private
junior high school. Third, I compare a change in the competitive ratio for private junior high
school before the revision with that after the revision.22 If education-minded families chose to
enroll in a private school after the fifth revision had been implemented, there might have been a
rise in the enrollment rate or in the entrance competition rate.
First, I check the distribution of parental schooling. It is clear from the descriptive statistics
in Table 2.2 that the dierences in parental years of schooling are not significant in both the
father and mother, and that the distributions of public and private junior high school graduates
are almost symmetrical. This feature is more visible when comparing histograms of the parental
years of schooling (Figures 2.1 and 2.2). These histograms show no significant dierence in the
shape of the distribution of public and private school graduates. Moreover, both public and
private school graduates only have a common increasing trend of the number of parents who
graduated from high school. These results assure the validity of the assumption that children of
more educated parents did not move from a public to a private school after the revision.
Second, I examine the pattern in the percentage of students who went to private junior high
school around the revision.23 If the revision of standards aects the decision to enroll in a
private junior high school, the enrollment rate would have a discontinuity at the time of the
revision. Figure 2.3 displays the private junior high school enrollment rates from the 1974 to
22The competitive ratio is the ratio of applicants to capacity at an entrance exam of a private junior high school.
23The number of private junior high schools in all of Japan was 551 in 1976, 547 in 1977, 551 in 1978, 552 in
1979, 548 in 1980, 550 in 1981 and 550 in 1982.
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the 1985 school years. Vertical lines are placed at the school years of the announcement and
the enforcement of the fifth revision. Both total and female enrollment rates have a smooth
trend over the periods, and in particular, there is no consistent pattern around the vertical lines.
Although there is an evidence of a drop in 1980, the change is small (less than 0.3%). Therefore,
I cannot find any significant change when the revised standards were in force. Furthermore,
there was no eect of the revision on private school enrollment rate even at the time of the
announcement.
Finally, I investigate the change in the competitive ratio of private junior high schools. Fig-
ures 2.4 and 2.5 show the cumulative distribution of the change in the competitive ratio for
private schools from the 1979 to 1980 school year (before the revision) and from the 1980 to
1981 school year (after the revision). If more children wanted to attend a private school after the
revision, then more private schools would have an increase in their entrance competition rate.
However, as the figure of the full sample shows, the ratio has actually declined (Figure 2.4).24
In addition, I restrict the sample to the prestigious schools with a high deviation value in the
entrance examination diculty, and find that almost no school showed a rise in its competitive
ratio (Figure 2.5). These results suggest that potential students of public junior high schools
who had high academic achievement or education-oriented families did not switch to private
schools after the revision.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Eect on Total Years of Schooling
The estimated results of the eect of the curriculum standards revision on the years of school-
ing are shown in Table 2.3. The estimation method is OLS. In the table, “Treatment eect”
corresponds to the “” in the estimation model above.
Column 1 shows that the revision decreases years of schooling by about 0.5 years. This
result is statistically significant. Even if I control the birth year and the regional fixed eects, the
coecients show a small change (columns 2 to 4). In addition, the values are not significantly
changed when I include the variable of paternal occupation; thus the results are robust to this
additional control (column 5).
The revision has a significantly negative eect on the total years of education as a measure
of the overall eect on educational attainment. Next, I determine how the standards revision
aects the additional schooling decision in each educational level.
24The change in the ratio from 1979 to 1980 might reflect the lessening of competition in 1979, because there
was a sharp decline in the number of elementary school graduates of the 1966 birth cohort. The fertility rate
dropped sharply in 1966 due to the child avoidance during the year of the fire horse (hinoeuma). For further
explanation of the child avoidance during the year of the fire horse, see Akabayashi (2008) and Rohlfs, Reed, and
Yamada (2010).
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2.5.2 University Enrollment
Table 2.4 summarizes the eect on university (four-year college) enrollment. I estimate the
probit model in this analysis and report the marginal eects. Column 1 shows that the revision
decreases the probability of university enrollment by about 4%. This negative eect is similar
to that on years of schooling. However, the result is not statistically significant. Furthermore,
when I control the fixed eects or the father’s occupation, it makes the coecients unstable
(columns 2 to 5).
These results suggest that the influence of the reduction of teaching hours in the compul-
sory educational level does not reach the higher educational level. The negative eect on the
total years of education in Table 2.3 stems from an impact in the earlier stages of education.
Therefore, I estimate the eects on the academic upper secondary school enrollment in the next
section.
2.5.3 Upper Secondary School Enrollment
I present the results of the upper secondary school enrollment in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. The probit
model is estimated and the marginal eects are reported as well in Table 2.4.
Table 2.5 shows the 3 to 4% negative eect of the revision on high school enrollment.
All estimates are statistically significant even when I control for fixed eects (columns 1 to 4).
These statistical significances are dierent from the results of university enrollment. In addition,
the statistical significance is robust when controlling for the father’s occupation (column 5).
These results suggest that an institutional change in junior high schools has a stronger eect on
the decision of enrollment in the next educational stage. To confirm this interpretation, I show
the eects on all upper secondary school enrollment decisions in Table 2.6.
In Table 2.6, the outcome variable takes unity if a respondent has some schooling in a high
school or a technical college. That is, the results can be interpreted as indicating eects on
decisions at all the academic post-compulsory school enrollment in Japan. The reduction of
instructional time decreases upper secondary school enrollment by about 3% and the estimates
are statistically significant as well, as shown in Table 2.5. Moreover, estimates are slightly
smaller than the size of the coecient of the eect on high school enrollment. These smaller
eects suggest that the analysis is accurate. Therefore, the results show that the standards
revision in the lower secondary school strongly influenced the enrollment in the next stage of
the education such as in upper secondary school.
2.5.4 Discussion
To summarize the all estimated results, reduction in total instructional time decreases the prob-
ability of women’s schooling beyond the compulsory education by about 3 to 4%. However, it
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has no statistically significant eect on university enrollment. Finally, all changes in educational
attainment taken together translate into a decrease in total years of schooling by approximately
0.5 years.
I interpret the results of this analysis as follows. The instructional time reduction of junior
high school in a compulsory education period mainly aects the formation of the academic
skill attainment that is highly correlated to the individual’s cognitive abilities. Therefore, the
public school curriculum revision has a strong influence on the population with low motivation
to study because their classroom studying time in their school occupies an important part in the
overall training time for their cognitive skill development. It is also critical that the opportunities
for accumulating cognitive skills decrease at a relatively early stage such as a period of the
compulsory education.
This sensitive population is likely to be located at the lower tail of the education distribu-
tion.25 A decline in accumulation of the cognitive skill at the early teens reduces the probability
to enroll in an upper secondary school, which is a prerequisite for the higher education. This
consequence further reduces the chance of accumulating cognitive abilities. A reduction in
years of education also implies a negative eect on a chance to get more high-wage occupa-
tions.
In contrast, the top population is expected to potentially enroll in a university. The amount of
time of studying in junior high school classes is not decisive of their high school enrollment. If
students who are receiving the education at the time of the university enrollment decision mainly
belong to the population that is not strongly aected by the reduction of time, there would no
eect of the reduction on university enrollment. Based on this, the revision of curriculum
standards has a statistically significant eect only on upper secondary schooling, and does not
aect the university enrollment significantly.
This interpretation is similar to that suggested in the literature. For instance Pischke (2007)
shows that the negative eect on the total years of education disappear when he controls the
choice of secondary education track, which has dierent completion years. This suggests that
the eect on the total years of education highly depends on the choice of courses for the sec-
ondary education. Moreover, one of the reasons for the weak instrument problem suggested in
the previous studies also supports the validity of the interpretation. In the studies that use an in-
stitutional change of compulsory education system as an instrumental variable (IV), the IV has
a strong impact only on students who finish their schooling at the compulsory education level.
These students are at the very bottom tail of the education distribution; thus, the IV usually does
not aect their college enrollment decisions.26
As described above, the results of this study were generally consistent with those of the
previous studies. However, there is room for discussion about the size of the treatment eect.
25For example, Kawaguchi (2011) provides evidence that the compulsory school days reduction more signifi-
cantly aects students with less-educated parents.
26See Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2005), for example.
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In the fifth revision of the curriculum standards used in this analysis, the total reduction of the
instructional time was 445 school teaching hours over three years (about one-third year). This
is a small change compared to those of previous studies that have changes totaling about one
year. In spite of its relatively smaller change, this analysis shows an estimated eect larger than
those of previous studies. There are two possible explanations for this result.
First, the change analyzed in this study was more influential to education attainment com-
pared with those of previous studies. Previous studies use the variation of the nominal years
of education and the length of instructional periods. It is not clear how these changes aect
the instructional time and the quality or quantity of educational content. On the other hand,
in the revision used in the present study, the instructional time is significantly reduced without
changing the nominal years of education and instructional weeks. This had a strong negative
impact on academic achievement at the post-compulsory school enrollment stage. In addition,
as Meghir and Palme (2005) show, the eect of policy change has a stronger eect on women.
Since the sample of this study includes only women, the estimated results can be larger than the
estimates with a sample that includes men.
Second, the results of this study include biased estimates. In this analysis, there is a possi-
bility of ability bias because I am unable to control for the abilities of individuals. However, as
I show in Section 4, students with superior abilities did not move from public schools to private
schools after the revision of the curriculum standards. Therefore, the first possibility is a more
reasonable explanation than this one.
2.6 Robustness Check
In this section I examine the robustness of the main results presented in the results section.
First, I investigate whether the revision changes cram school enrollment when an individual
was a junior high school student. In addition, I show that the estimated results are not sensi-
tive to the inclusion of an additional independent variable of cram school attendance when an
individual was in an elementary school or in a junior high school. Second, I show that the esti-
mated results are robust to the inclusion of additional controls of local labor market conditions
when an individual was in a junior high school. Third, I investigate the eects of the revision in
the transition period to show that the main results are not aected by the curriculum standards
revision in elementary schools, which accompanied the revision in junior high schools. Fourth,
I show that the main results are not sensitive to the exclusion of prefectures that experienced
an exceptional high school selection system during the period under study. Fifth, I show that
changing the specification of the parental education variables does not aect the previous con-
clusion. Finally, I show the statistical significance of the main results with dierent definitions
of clustering of the standard errors. All the following analyses are based on the estimation
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model in Section 2.4.1.
First, I examine whether cram school enrollment during the junior high school period is
aected by the revision. If the revision raises cram school enrollment as an additional invest-
ment in extra-school education, then studying in a cram school might compensate the eects of
instructional time reduction in junior high school. Table 2.7 provides estimated results of the
eect of the curriculum standards revision on cram school enrollment. The dependent variable
is a dummy that takes unity if the individual attended a cram school when she was a junior high
school student. The estimates suggest that the revision increases cram school enrollment, but
the eect is statistically insignificant and the magnitudes of coecient are unstable.
Although the results in Table 2.7 suggest that the revision does not significantly increase
cram school enrollment rate, it is worth investigating an omitted variable bias problem of cram
school enrollment. If cram school enrollment is endogenous and is aected by the revision,
controlling for it captures a part of the eect of the revision, but excluding for it may provide
biased estimates of the eect. Thus, I show that the additional control variable of cram school
enrollment does not change the statistical significance or magnitude of the eect of the main
results.
Table 2.8 reveals the eect of cram school enrollment in elementary school. The other
explanatory variables are the same as those in the analysis in the previous section. For the years
of schooling, cram school enrollment has a small negative eect. However, this direct eect
on total education is not statistically significant. Moreover, the results of the treatment eect
are similar those in Table 2.3 even if I control for the cram school enrollment (columns 1 to
3). The results from columns 4 to 6 provide evidence of the eect on the decision to enroll
in high school. Cram school enrollment in elementary school has about 2% negative eect on
high school enrollment. The magnitudes of the treatment eects are slightly larger than those
in Table 2.5 if I include the cram school enrollment dummy, but the eects are still negative and
statistically significant. These prove that the results provided in Tables 2.3 and 2.5 are robust to
controls for cram school enrollment during the elementary school period.
Table 2.9 presents the results for cram school enrollment in junior high school. Columns 1
to 3 report the eect of cram school enrollment on years of schooling. Cram school enrollment
in junior high school has a positive but statistically insignificant eect. The additional control of
cram school enrollment does not aect coecients of the treatment eect. As shown in columns
4 to 6, using a cram school increases high school enrollment by about 3 to 4%, and the estimates
are statistically significant. Although the cram school enrollment control reduces the magnitude
of the treatment eect, the changes are very small. These suggest that the main results in the
previous section are robust to controls for cram school enrollment during the junior high school
period.
Second, I show that the main results are robust to controlling for local labor market condi-
tions. If labor market conditions changed across regions and aected parental income or raised
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the opportunity costs of post- compulsory schooling dierently during the junior high school
period, not controlling for such variations might exaggerate the negative eects of school hour
reduction. To mitigate this concern, I re-estimate the main analysis while controlling for the
active job opening to application ratio (yuko kyujin bairitsu) and the average monthly male
earnings at the prefecture level. The data sources for these two variables are the report of the
Employment Service Agency (shokugyou antei gyoumu toukei) and the Basic Survey on Wage
Structure of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, respectively. These variables are aver-
aged over the three years of junior high school. Table 2.10 shows that the main results are almost
unchanged by these additional controls, except that the standard errors are a little smaller.
Third, I investigate the eects of the curriculum standards revision in junior high schools
during the transition period. It shows that the main results are not aected by the accompanying
curriculum standards revision in elementary schools. As described in the section 2.2, the fifth
revision of the curriculum standards for public elementary schools was announced in 1977 and
the full implementation started from the 1980 school year. In the analysis in the previous sec-
tion, all students in the after-revision group (1969–74) were aected by the revision, therefore
the estimated treatment eects might include the eects of revision in elementary schools.
In the main analysis, I assume that the eects of the revision in elementary schools are
negligible for two reasons. First, the reduction in school hours was very limited. The total
reduction of school hours over six years was 36 class units (from 5821 to 5785 units), that
is, a reduction of about 0.6%. The reduction was equivalent to less than 6 hours per grade
since the number of standard annual school weeks remained as 35 weeks and the class unit
time, as 45 minutes. Second, the proportion of private elementary students was very small.
According to the School Basic Survey, private elementary school students were less than 0.6%
of the total elementary school students. It means that more than 99% of junior high school
students attended a public elementary school under the same curriculum standards. Therefore,
dierences in elementary school hours across each birth year are captured by the controls for
birth year eects.
Although the eects of this revision in elementary schools might be negligible, it is worth
investigating the pure eects of the revision in junior high schools. However, it is dicult to
estimate the pure eects directly because I am unable to define a proper control group. The data
set does not indicate whether the respondents graduated from a public or a private elementary
school. Furthermore, all cohorts in the after-revision group of the junior high school revision
were also aected by the elementary school revision.
Therefore, I estimate the eects of the revision in the transition period instead of investi-
gating the eects of the full implementation. To estimate the eects in the transition period,
I consider individuals born from 1964 to 1965 as the new after group because they graduated
from elementary school before the 1978 school year and enrolled in junior high school during
the transition period of the junior high school revision. The new curriculum standards were
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partially in eect during the transition period, and thus, the school hours were reduced. If the
reduction in school hours in public junior high schools has meaningful impact, one can expect
some negative eects on educational achievement for public junior high school graduates. The
magnitude of the eects is ambiguous since implementation during the transition period was
not unified. The revision allowed each prefecture, municipality, or school to have dierent
treatment situations in the transition period.
Table 2.11 reports the eects of the revision in junior high schools during the transition
period. Panel A presents the eects of the revision on years of schooling. Columns 3 and
4 of the transition period show the negative treatment eects, and it can be observed that the
size of the coecients is smaller than the base results in columns 1 and 2. Panel B reports
the marginal eects on high school enrollment probability.27 As shown in columns 7 and 8,
the negative treatment eects in the transition period are larger than the results from the base
case specifications displayed in columns 5 and 6. To summarize the results, the revision in the
transition period has stable negative eects as expected, but eects are statistically insignificant
for the restricted sample size. The result in column 7 is statistically significant at the 10% level,
which is an exception.
Fourth, I investigate the eect of the revision by excluding the eects of an exceptional
selection system of high school entrance. One possible concern in relation to biased estimates
of the eects of the revision is that some prefectures used an unusual high school entrance
selection system during the period under study. The system was called the comprehensive
selection (sogo senbatsu) system. The comprehensive selection system is one of the entrance
examination systems for municipal high schools. The system was designed to ease the heated
competition between students in the high school entrance examination and to correct disparities
in educational levels between municipal high schools in the same school district.
In the usual selection system, junior high school graduates apply for a municipal high school
in which they wish to enroll, and then, each high school chooses its students. In the compre-
hensive selection system, junior high school graduates cannot apply for each school in which
they wish to enroll. They are assigned to a school district, or they apply for one of the groups
of high schools in the school district. When applicants meet the entrance examination criteria,
the system allocates applicants equally to each school in the school district or to each school in
the group of schools. The system allocates applicants based on not only academic achievement,
but also the distance from their residence to a school.28
In the period under study, in all, 15 prefectures experienced the comprehensive selection
system fully or partially.29 If the selection system directly aected high school enrollment,
27In Panel B, regional controls are excluded for the restricted sample size.
28See Minken Chuto Kyoiku Kaikaku Kenkyukai (1984) or Kurohane (1994) for a detailed description of the
comprehensive selection system.
29The comprehensive selection system was implemented in following prefectures: Chiba, Tokyo, Fukui, Ya-
manashi, Gifu, Aichi, Mie, Kyoto, Hyogo, Okayama, Hiroshima, Tokushima, Nagasaki, Oita and Miyazaki.
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a failure to control for the dierences between systems might bias estimates of the eects of
the revision. To mitigate this concern, I exclude prefectures that experienced the comprehensive
selection system and re-estimate the main analysis. I do not use a dummy on the comprehensive
selection system or a set of prefecture dummy variables, because the implementation of the
system was dierent between prefectures and within each prefecture.
Table 2.12 shows the estimates without the prefectures that experienced the comprehensive
selection system. Panel A presents the eects of the revision on years of schooling. Columns
4 to 6, without the comprehensive selection system, show the statistically significant negative
treatment eects, and the magnitude of these eects is larger than the base results in columns
1 to 3. Panel B reports the marginal eects on high school enrollment probability. In columns
10 to 12, the treatment eects without the comprehensive selection system are similar to the
base results displayed in columns 7 to 9. These results show that the statistically significant
negative eects of the revision are robust to the exclusion of prefectures that experienced the
comprehensive selection system. The results also suggest that the comprehensive selection
system does not directly aect high school enrollment, but it slightly osets the eects of the
revision after high school enrollment.
Fifth, I examine whether the specification of the parental education variables matters with
the main results. Table 2.13 shows the estimates with an alternative specification of the variables
with the standard set of covariates in the previous section. In the last three columns in each
panel, the parental education variable is defined as a dummy that equals one if a parent received
education beyond the compulsory level. The first three columns of each panel reproduce the
base case results for easy reference.
Panel A presents the eects of the revision on years of schooling. Columns 4 to 6 with
the alternative specification show the significantly negative treatment eects, but the size of the
coecients is between 0.05 to 0.08, larger than the base results in columns 1 to 3. Panel B
reports the marginal eects on high school enrollment probability. In columns 10 to 12, the al-
ternative parental education controls do not change the results from the base case specifications,
which are reproduced in columns 7 to 9. These results suggest that the specification change of
the parental education variables does not aect the statistically significant negative eect of the
treatment; thus the main results in the previous section are robust.
Finally, I discuss the standard errors. In practice, it is not always obvious how to define
the clusters, and thus, it can be dicult to know the appropriate level at which to cluster, in
this study. Therefore, I provide alternative definitions of clustering of the standard errors for a
robustness check. Table 2.14 presents the Huber-White robust standard errors (column 1), and
clustering robust standard errors clustered by the establishment type of the junior high school
(column 2), by the establishment type of the junior high school and graduated from a junior high
school before/after the revision (column 3), by the establishment type of the junior high school
and birth year cohort (column 4), by the establishment type of the junior high school, birth year
28
cohort and the region lived during junior high school (column 5) and by the establishment type
of a junior high school, birth year cohort and the prefecture lived during junior high school
(column 6). The establishment type of a junior high school is public or private. In the results
section, I report the standard errors in the specification of column 4.
Panel A shows the results based on the specification of columns 1 and 4 of Table 2.3. In this
case, the estimates are statistically significant from column 2 to column 4 even if I control for
the fixed eects, but are not significant in the other columns. Panel B presents the results of high
school enrollment with the specifications of columns 1 and 4 in Table 2.5. The estimates are
almost statistically significant at the 10% level with in the Huber-White robust standard errors
(column 1) and statistically significant at the 10% level under the definition of clustering that
has the largest number of clustering groups (column 6) when I include fixed eect controls. As
shown in the table, the statistical significance of the results is dependent on the definition of
standard errors, and estimates with very small number of clusters might be biased. However, as
shown in columns 2 and 3, if I drop the dimension of the clustering, the results are statistically
significant at the 1% level. In addition, the standard errors are stable and small even in the
specifications that cannot reject the null hypothesis. Considering the sample size is as small as
about 1,100, the results are almost robust from the definition of standard errors.
2.7 Conclusion
This study studies the eects of the substantial reduction of instructional time on the educational
attainment with the DID method that uses the fifth revision of curriculum standards in Japan as a
quasi-experiment. The revision is unique since it reduces instructional time but does not change
the main source of variation in the literature such as the length of school weeks, compulsory
years of education, and fundamental educational systems.
In the main results, the 445-hour reduction of the total teaching hours over three years, which
corresponds to about one-third year, decreases the years of education by about 0.5 years, and
the probability of schooling beyond the compulsory education by about 3 to 4% for women.
These results are statistically significant and larger compared with those of previous studies
since the contents of the revision have a direct influence on the length of instructional time
itself. In addition, it is necessary to note that the analysis sample of this study includes only
women owing to the availability of the data set. As previous studies suggest, the revision might
have a more significant eect for women.
The negative impact of the school instructional time reduction in the public education is
important to later educational achievement. In particular, as the results of this study suggest,
a change in compulsory education is more influential to children with families that have low
educational motivation, since learning in school is critical for their academic skill development.
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In this study, because the available data set has no information on parental income, I cannot
analyze the role of parental income in detail. However, the heterogeneous eects of policy
reform in compulsory education by degree of household poverty may be examined in further
research.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Before the Revision After the Revision
Birth year: 1960 - 62 1969 - 74
Public Private Public Private
Years of schooling 12.87 12.19 13.13 13.00
(1.56) (1.92) (1.74) (2.15)
Father’s years of schooling 10.96 11.06 11.82 11.85
(2.36) (2.64) (2.44) (2.74)
Mother’s years of schooling 10.57 10.58 11.42 11.46
(1.86) (1.80) (1.86) (2.05)
Nuber of siblings 2.60 2.74 2.44 2.25
(1.11) (1.15) (0.77) (0.79)
Number of observations 323 31 694 67
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics. Before the revision indicates the statistics for individ-
uals who graduated from a junior high school before the fifth revision of the curriculum standards. After
the revision indicates the statistics for individuals who enrolled in a junior high school after the standards
were enforced. Public and Private indicate the establishment type of the junior high school from which
the individuals graduated. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 2.3: The Eect of the Revision on Years of Schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment eect -0.504 -0.493 -0.551 -0.538 -0.463
(0.225)** (0.240)* (0.209)** (0.221)** (0.216)**
Birth year controls yes yes yes
Regional controls yes yes yes
Father’s job controls yes
Number of observations 1115 1115 1115 1115 1115
Notes: This table reports the OLS estimates of years of schooling. Treatment eect is the coecient
of a dummy variable that takes one if an individual enrolled in a public junior high school after the
standards were revised. Birth year controls are a set of indicator variables for birth year. Regional
controls include a set of indicator variables for region that an individual lived when she was a junior
high school student. Father’s job controls indicate a set of dummies for paternal job. The following
variables are also included as controls; an indicator for public junior high school graduates, an indicator
for individuals who enrolled in a junior high school after the standards were revised, parental years of
schooling, and number of siblings. Standard errors are in parenthesis, clustered by public/private and
birth year cohort. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% level respectively.
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Table 2.4: The Eect of the Revision on University Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment eect -0.037 -0.026 -0.040 -0.028 -0.017
(0.054) (0.058) (0.056) (0.058) (0.050)
Birth year controls yes yes yes
Regional controls yes yes yes
Father’s job controls yes
Number of observations 1115 1115 1115 1115 1115
Notes: This table reports the marginal eects from the probit estimates of university or four year college
enrollment (an indicator variable that is equal to one if an individual has ever attended a university).
Treatment eect is the coecient of a dummy variable that takes one if an individual enrolled in a public
junior high school after the standards were revised. Birth year controls are a set of indicator variables for
birth year. Regional controls include a set of indicator variables for region that an individual lived when
she was a junior high school student. Father’s job controls indicate a set of dummies for paternal job. The
following variables are also included as controls; an indicator for public junior high school graduates, an
indicator for individuals who enrolled in a junior high school after the standards were revised, parental
years of schooling, and number of siblings. Standard errors are in parenthesis, clustered by public/private
and birth year cohort. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% level respectively.
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Table 2.5: The Eect of the Revision on High School Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment eect -0.034 -0.031 -0.041 -0.038 -0.037
(0.017)** (0.014)** (0.015)*** (0.016)** (0.016)**
Birth year controls yes yes yes
Regional controls yes yes yes
Father’s job controls yes
Number of observations 1115 1115 1115 1115 1115
Notes: This table reports the marginal eects from the probit estimates of high school enrollment (an
indicator variable that is equal to one if an individual enrolled in a high school after she graduated
from a junior high school). Treatment eect is the coecient of a dummy variable that takes one if an
individual enrolled in a public junior high school after the standards were revised. Birth year controls
are a set of indicator variables for birth year. Regional controls include a set of indicator variables for
region that an individual lived when she was a junior high school student. Father’s job controls indicate
a set of dummies for paternal job. The following variables are also included as controls; an indicator
for public junior high school graduates, an indicator for individuals who enrolled in a junior high school
after the standards were revised, parental years of schooling, and number of siblings. Standard errors
are in parenthesis, clustered by public/private and birth year cohort. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at 1, 5, and 10% level respectively.
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Table 2.6: The Eect of the Revision on Post-Compulsory Schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment eect -0.030 -0.027 -0.035 -0.032 -0.031
(0.016)* (0.013)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)**
Birth year controls yes yes yes
Regional controls yes yes yes
Father’s job controls yes
Number of observations 1115 1115 1115 1115 1115
Notes: This table reports the marginal eects from the probit estimates of post compulsory school en-
rollment (an indicator variable that is equal to one if an individual enrolled in a high school or a technical
college after she graduated from a junior high school). Treatment eect is the coecient of a dummy
variable that takes one if an individual enrolled in a public junior high school after the standards were
revised. Birth year controls are a set of indicator variables for birth year. Regional controls include a
set of indicator variables for region that an individual lived when she was a junior high school student.
Father’s job controls indicate a set of dummies for paternal job. The following variables are also in-
cluded as controls; an indicator for public junior high school graduates, an indicator for individuals who
enrolled in a junior high school after the standards were revised, parental years of schooling, and number
of siblings. Standard errors are in parenthesis, clustered by public/private and birth year cohort. ***, **,
and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% level respectively.
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Table 2.7: The Eect of the Revision on Cram School Enrollment
(1) (2) (3)
0.063 0.034 0.043
Treatment eect (0.091) (0.096) (0.087)
Birth year controls yes yes
Regional controls yes yes
Father’s job controls yes
Number of observations 1101 1101 1101
Notes: This table reports the marginal eects from the probit estimates of cram school enrollment (an
indicator variable that is equal to one if an individual enrolled in a cram school when she was a junior high
school student). Treatment eect is the coecient of a dummy variable that takes one if an individual
enrolled in a public junior high school after the standards were revised. Birth year controls are a set
of indicator variables for birth year. Regional controls include a set of indicator variables for region
that an individual lived when she was a junior high school student. Father’s job controls indicate a set
of dummies for paternal job. The following variables are also included as controls; an indicator for
public junior high school graduates, an indicator for individuals who enrolled in a junior high school
after the standards were revised, parental years of schooling, and number of siblings. Standard errors
are in parenthesis, clustered by public/private and birth year cohort. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at 1, 5, and 10% level respectively.
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Chapter 3
Estimating the Returns to Higher
Education in Japan
3.1 Introduction
One remaining task for education policies in developed countries is providing the widespread
opportunity to go to college. The trends of university enrollment rate in Japan suggest that the
task is progressing satisfactorily in the aggregate. The rate has risen from 17.1% in 1970 to
more than 50% in 2010 according to the School Basic Survey. By contrast, an equal opportu-
nity to access to higher education is still a matter under discussion. In the field of sociology
of education, the recent empirical studies find a regional inequality of accessibility to universi-
ties.1 In addition, OECD (2013) points out a burden of high tuition fees in Japan: “the average
annual fee to attend public tertiary institutions was USD 5019 during the academic year 2010–
2011”, which was “the fifth highest annual fee among (OECD) countries with available data”.
Therefore, researchers are expected to analyze the eects of an education policy increasing the
availability of accessible, aordable higher education. To evaluate such a policy, researchers
need to precisely estimate the impact of college attendance for those who are aected by the
policy. However, it is hard to implement the task if eects are heterogeneous and individuals
endogenously self-select into college based on their gains.
One way to deal with the endogenous schooling decision is using the instrumental variable
(IV) approach. The recent literature addresses endogenous selection of college attendance by
instrumenting it with a variation in local accessibility to college during adolescent years. For
example, Card (1993), Kane and Rouse (1993), Currie and Moretti (2003), Cameron and Taber
(2004), Carneiro, Meghir, and Parey (2013) show positive returns to schooling using an in-
strument of substitute for costs of college attendance, such as distance to college and college
existence at the county of residence.
1For example, see Sasaki (2006), Kobayashi (2009), Nakazawa (2011).
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Despite the growing body of the literature in this approach, it provides a limited implication
for a policy intervention. The standard IV estimates capture an eect related to the local average
treatment eect (LATE) of Imbens and Angrist (1994). The LATE shows the return to schooling
for individuals induced to go to school by the change in the instrument. Heckman and Vytlacil
(1999, 2001b, 2005), Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006), Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil
(2010, 2011) point out that individuals who are induced to go to college in the LATE are not
necessarily equivalent to those who are induced to go to college by a change in the policy of
interest.
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001a, 2005) propose an alternative way to use instruments.
They show that average treatment parameters widely analyzed in the literature of policy evalu-
ation can be identified as weighted averages of the marginal treatment eect (MTE) introduced
by Björklund and Mott (1987) and Heckman and Vytlacil (1999). Using this approach, re-
cent studies find positive average eects of college education in dierent countries and regions,
such as Chuang and Lai (2010) in Taiwan, Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2011) in US and
Nybom (2012) in Sweden.
In Japan, many studies also investigate returns to schooling. However, Oshio and Seno
(2007), Yasui and Sano (2009) point out that very limited studies are motivated to estimate
causal eects of schooling. Oshio and Seno (2007) also suggest that the number of empirical
studies using Japanese micro data is small due to the data availability.2 One exception is Naka-
muro and Inui (2012). Using the web-based twin data, they find significant positive returns to
schooling in Japan. Unfortunately, their fixed-eects approach using twins only controls for
dierences in family level, and thus, cannot control for unobserved individual heterogeneity
that aects schooling decisions.
This study estimates returns to university education in Japan using an approach introduced
by Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001a, 2005), which allows self-selection of university enroll-
ment under heterogeneous eects across individuals. To deal with the endogenous schooling
decision, I use public tuition, local availability of universities, and local labor market con-
ditions as instruments. For the local availability of universities, I collect all information of
opening/closing and increasing/decreasing of accredited capacities of universities in Japan and
create a measure at the prefecture level. This measure reflects cost of preparation for taking
examination and probability of acceptance besides geographical moving costs or costs of not
living at the home with parents.
The main results show that average eects of a year of university education in Japan are
significant and positive, but highly varied across sub-group of population categorized by their
treatment status. The results also suggest that policies increasing probability of university en-
rollment, such as free tuition and an increase in local capacities of universities, bring about
positive eects of university education.
2Oshio and Seno (2007) comprehensively survey the empirical studies of economics of education in Japan.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the empirical
framework. Section 3.3 describes the data. Section 3.4 presents and discusses the results.
Finally, I conclude in Section 3.5.
3.2 Empirical Framework
This section describes estimation model and method. I basically follow the model of Heckman
and Vytlacil (2005); Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2010, 2011). They consider a standard
model of potential outcomes that is firstly applied to schooling in Willis and Rosen (1979).
3.2.1 Setup
Let consider a linear-in-the-parameters model with two potential outcomes:
Y1 = X 1 +U1 (3.1)
Y0 = X 0 +U0;
where subscript 0 and 1 correspond to the untreated and treated states. X are observable and
(U1;U0) are unobservable variables. The assumption on linearity or separable outcomes are
not required for identification, but they are useful in practice for estimation and are commonly
assumed in the literature. Let D = 1 denotes enroll in university; D = 0 denotes not enroll in
university, the measured outcome variable Y can be written in a potential outcomes framework:
Y = DY1 + (1   D)Y0 (3.2)
This equation is related to a latent variable discrete choice model that represents an individual’s
decision on university enrollment. I assume the following selection model:
D = D (Z )   V
D = 1 i f D  0;
= 0 otherwise
or D = 1[D (Z )   V  0];
where V is a unobserved continuous random variable with a strictly increasing distribution
function FV . Z is a vector of observed random variables that includes some part of X . Z also
includes variables that determine the treatment decision but do not directly aect the outcome
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(the exclusion restriction). Formally, I assume that Z and X satisfy; Z 6y D jX , and Z; X y
(V;U1;U0). In addition, I need to assume a support condition for X on the university enrollment
probability; 0  Pr (D = 1jX )  1.
Let Pr (D = 1jZ ) denotes the probability of university enrollment conditional on Z , the
assumption on V allows to rewrite the selection equation as:
D = 1[Fv (D (Z ))  Fv (V )]
= 1[P(Z )  UD];
with
UD
def
= Fv (V )  Uni f [0;1]
P(Z ) def= Fv (D (Z )) = Pr[D = 1jZ]:
Using equations 3.1 and 3.2, the observed outcome can be written as:
Y = X 0 + DX (1   0) + D(U1  U0) +U0 (3.3)
= X 0 + DX  +  :
This equation indicates that the eect of university enrollment varies across individuals for
dierences in their X and U1;U0. If the enrollment decision depends on unobservable gain
U1   U0, a dummy variable D is not independent of the disturbance  . In this case, neither
ordinary least squares (OLS) nor simple linear IV estimates recover the standard average eect
parameters, such as the average treatment eect (ATE): E(Y1   Y0), the ATE on treated (ATT):
E(Y1   Y0 jD = 1), and the ATE on untreated (ATU): E(Y1   Y0 jD = 0). Heckman and Vytlacil
(1999, 2001a, 2005) establish that these treatment parameters of interest can be identified as
weighted averages of the MTE of Björklund and Mott (1987) and Heckman and Vytlacil
(1999). The MTE is defined as:
MTE(x;uD)
def
= E(Y1   Y0 jX = x;UD = uD)
The MTE indicates the eects of university enrollment for individuals with X = x who would
be indierent between enrollment or not under the situation that they are exogenously assigned
a value of Z such asUD = uD.
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3.2.2 Estimating Marginal Treatment Eect
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001a, 2005) show that the MTE can be identified by the local
instrumental variables. Using the equation 3.3, the conditional expectation of Y given X = x,
and P(Z ) = p is
E[Y jX = x;P(Z ) = p] = x 0 + x(1   0)p + K (p) (3.4)
= x 0 +
Z p
0
MTE(x;uD)duD;
where,
K (p) = E(U1  U0 jD = 1;P(Z ) = p)
=
Z 1
 1
Z p
0
(u1   u0) f (u1   u0 jX = x;UD = uD)duDd(u1   u0);
where f (u1   u0 jX = x;UD = uD) is the conditional density ofU1  U0. Therefore, the MTE is
identified by dierentiating the equation 3.4 with respect to p,
@
@p
E[Y jX = x;P(Z ) = p] = E[Y1   Y0 jX = x;UD = uD]: (3.5)
The equation 3.4 can be estimated using the model of a semi-parametric approach, such as
partially linear model of Robinson (1988), and the equation 3.5 can be estimated in non-
parametrically. One of the disadvantages of the semi-parametric approach is that the MTE
can only be estimated over the empirical support of P(Z ), thus it is not possible to identify
conventional treatment parameters that require full unit interval of P(Z ). An alternative way of
estimating the MTE is a parametric approach assuming on the joint normal distribution of the
unobservables (U0; U1; V ), and estimating the outcome and selection equations together using
the method of maximum likelihood.3 This parametric approach is a conventional way of esti-
mating the equations and is related to the switching regression models (Björklund and Mott,
1987; Willis and Rosen, 1979).4 An advantage of specifying the normality assumption is that
it helps to estimate the MTE over full unit interval of P(Z ) and to recover the treatment eect
parameters of interest.
3.2.3 Policy Relevant Treatment Eects
Once the MTE is estimated, the parameters that are directly relevant to the policy questions can
also be estimated as weighted averages of it. I compute the policy relevant treatment eects
3In the estimation, I normalize the variance of V to 1.
4See also Heckman, Tobias, and Vytlacil (2001) for further description.
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(PRTE) introduced by Heckman and Vytlacil (2001b) and marginal version of PRTE (MPRTE)
proposed by Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2010). Let D, Y  and P denote the treatment
state, outcome and probability of university enrollment after the policy change, Heckman and
Vytlacil (2005, 2007) define the PRTE when E(D) , E(D) as,
E(Y )   E(Y )
E(D)   E(D)
def
=
Z 1
0
MTE(uD)!PRTE (uD)duD;
where,
!PRTE (uD) =
Fp(uD)   Fp (uD)
EFp (P)   EFp (P)
;
where Fp and Fp are the distribution of P and P, respectively.5
The MPRTE is defined as the limit of PRTE with a sequence of alternative policies in-
dexed by a scalar variable  such that lim!0P (Z ) = P(Z ). I consider two policy sequences
as defined in Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2010, 2011): (1) a policy that increases the
probability of university enrollment by  so that P = P +  and (2) a policy that changes each
individual’s probability of university enrollment by the proportion (1+), so that P = (1+)P
3.3 Data
3.3.1 The Japanese General Social Survey
The main analysis data are the Japanese General Social Survey(JGSS).6 JGSS are repeated
cross-section data for men and women aged 20–89 on 1st September of each survey year. This
study uses surveys conducted in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2008, and 2010, and pools male
respondents from all waves. From the pooled original data, I exclude the observations in four
ways.
First, I limit the sample by their age. I exclude individuals who were younger than 28 years
old on the survey year because they might not complete their academic schooling. Second,
I drop the individuals who answered that their father or mother was absent at the age of 15.
5To simplify the notation, I suppress control variables.
6The Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS) are designed and carried out by the JGSS Research Center at
Osaka University of Commerce (Joint Usage / Research Center for Japanese General Social Surveys accredited
by Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology), in collaboration with the Institute of Social
Science at the University of Tokyo. The data for this secondary analysis, the JGSS, the JGSS Research Center,
was provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Center for Social Research and Data Archives, Institute
of Social Science, The University of Tokyo.
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Because their single parental structure might substantially dier from the families with cou-
ple parents, unobservable eects cannot be controlled. Third, I only use the observations who
reached their first university enrollment decision after 1972 school year due to the availability
of tuition data. Finally, I can use the respondents whose observational characteristics are avail-
able to match the comparable information on the instruments and covariates for the estimation
explained below. The remained sample after restrictions contains male workers were born in
1953–1979 and were 28–54 years old on the date of survey.
The JGSS have the advantage of including the information on workers’ annual income and
working hours per week. For the outcome variable, I compute the worker’s personal hourly
wage. Unfortunately, the JGSS only ask income measures by 19 categories. Following Oshio
and Kobayashi (2009) and Sano and Yasui (2009), I assign the median value of each category
and evaluate it at the 2005 consumer prices and transform it in logarithm.7
One of the disadvantages of the JGSS is that the data set only contains limited information
on the residence at the university enrollment decision. I use the information on the prefecture
where individuals resided at the age of 15 and assume that in the year of university enrollment,
their home (at least their parental residence) was in the prefecture. The control variables from
the JGSS are mother’s and father’s education (and these squares), number of siblings (and its
square), dummy variables indicating urban residence and rural (farm or fishing village) resi-
dence at the age of 15, a set of dummies for prefecture resided at the age of 15, and cohort
dummies. For the educational attainment of the respondents and their parents, I use the infor-
mation on the level of the last school attended and assign the standard years of schooling in
Japan.
I also control for long-term trends of the active job opening to application ratio (yuko kyujin
bairitsu) from the report of the Employment Service Agency (shokugyou antei gyoumu toukei)
and the annual average monthly total cash earnings of the Monthly Labor Survey (Maigetsu
Kinro Tokei Chosa), and local estimated population size at age 15–19 of the Population Census
(and its square) at the prefecture where individuals resided when they were 15 years old. In
addition, I include following three controls for current conditions: years of current job expe-
rience (and its square), unemployment rate in the region of residence on the survey year, and
the average monthly male earnings in the prefecture of residence on the survey year. The data
sources for unemployment rate and the average monthly male earnings are the Monthly Labor
Survey and the Basic Survey on Wage Structure.
In the analysis, I consider the binary treatment decision for university enrollment at the
completion of upper secondary education. Therefore, I separate individuals into two groups:
(1) individuals who graduated from high school or completed an upper secondary education,
7For the lowest category (less than 700,000 yen), I assign 700,000. For the highest category (over 23,000,000
yen), I assign 23,000,000. When I exclude the people in the lowest and the highest categories, the estimated results
are basically same.
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and (2) individuals who had some university education or more.8
3.3.2 Instrumental Variables
This section discusses the IVs for the university enrollment decision. I use dierential changes
in the direct and opportunity costs of university attendance across prefectures and cohorts, while
controlling for both permanent dierences and aggregate trends. The IVs are local university
availability measures containing all universities, average tuition of public university in the fresh-
man year, and local labor market conditions in high school years, in the prefecture where the
individual resided when he was 15 years old.9
3.3.2.1 Capacity of Universities
First, I describe a measure of the availability of local universities. Local college availability
measures are firstly used by Card (1993) and Kane and Rouse (1993) as a proxy of direct
costs of college attendance, and widely used in the literature. Kane and Rouse (1993) uses
a distance to college measure as an instrument for schooling, and followed by Carneiro et al.
(2011), Nybom (2012) in recent years. An indicator of presence of college in the county of
residence is used by Card (1993) as a substitute of distance to college, and it is commonly used
in the literature, for example, Kling (2001), Cameron and Taber (2004), Carneiro, Heckman,
and Vytlacil (2010, 2011), Carneiro, Meghir, and Parey (2013). Unfortunately, the JGSS only
have information on the prefecture of residence at the age of 15. Because all prefectures have
a university during the analyzed years in Japan, I am unable to use this local presence measure.
Currie and Moretti (2003) use the number of two- and four-year colleges as an instrument for
college attendance. This measure is superior to the indicator definition because its continuous
variations across residential areas and years allow to control for permanent dierences across
counties. Although the number of colleges measure partly takes into account the quantitative
dierences in college availability across residential areas, it is too rough to capture the exact
dierences in local opportunities of college education. Because the size of the colleges are
dierent among the region, each college has dierent eects on local availability of colleges. In
Japanese empirical studies in sociology of education, the number of enrollments is widely used
as a substitute of capacities of colleges oered.10 However, as Currie and Moretti (2003) point
8For the respondents, completion of their last schooling is available. When I construct the variable of years of
schooling, I reduce the number by one year from standard years for those who dropped out before finishing their
last school. However, I am unable to know whether dropouts of technical college completed their upper secondary
education. In the analysis, I assume that they completed their upper secondary education and included them in the
analysis sample. If I exclude them from the analysis sample, the main results are basically same.
9The construction of these data is amply described in the Data Appendix.
10For example, see Sasaki (2006), Kobayashi (2009).
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out, not only the supply of college places, but also the demand for these places determine the
number of enrollments, and thus it is not a valid instrument.
In this study, I construct a unique data set that contains the information on all accredited
capacities for new enrollments of universities by prefecture and year in Japan. I collect the
information at the department level and total up capacities of national, prefectural, municipal,
and private co-ed universities by prefecture. This measure is merged to the individual data
based on high school graduate’s standard college examination year and the residence at the age
of 15.11 I assume that this measure of local availability of universities is a proxy of easy access
to a local university; i.e., costs of geographical moving or costs of not living at their home with
parents. The quantitative characteristics of this measure also reflects costs of preparation for
taking examination and probability of acceptance.12
One potential problem of this capacity measure is that changes in cohort size are likely to
have an impact on the availability of universities given any fixed number of capacities (Card
and Lemieux, 2001; Currie and Moretti, 2003). To avoid this problem, I control for local cohort
size at age 15–19 when the individual was at age 18 in both selection and outcome equations.
Another concern on using this measure is that it is aected by new openings and an increase
in size of a university reflecting an expected increase of local demand for university education,
as well as the number of colleges measure of Currie and Moretti (2003). Although I am unable
to completely rule out these possibilities, the Japanese centralized educational system partly
mitigates this concern. The Japanese School Education Act (Gakko Kyoiku Ho) prior to the
revision in 2003 prescribes that all openings and closings of department of university are re-
quired to be approved by the national government in advance. Private universities also need an
approval for changes in capacities at the department level in advance.13 Therefore, all universi-
ties cannot freely control their capacities in response to the expected local demand of university
education.
3.3.2.2 Average Tuition in Public Universities
Second, I explain the variable of tuition for new enrollments. The tuition measure is created as
accredited capacities weighted averages over all public co-ed universities in a prefecture, or at
the regional level if there is no public university in the prefecture. Kane and Rouse (1993),
11When I merge the year at age of 18, the acquired results are basically same.
12Although I integrate all capacities of universities into one measure, changes in capacities might have hetero-
geneous eects on college attendance by student’s major field of study. In this study, because the available data
set has no information on the major field of study, I cannot analyze the impacts of college major choice in detail,
which I leave to future research.
13Public universities need to notice their changes in capacities in advance. Before 1974, private universities
are allowed to increase their capacities with a notification to the government in advance, therefore capacities of
private universities might not be a valid instrument in these periods. For a robustness check, I exclude individuals
who were born before 1955 and re-estimate the analysis. The results are almost similar but more imprecise for the
smaller sample size.
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Cameron and Heckman (1998, 2001), Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2010, 2011), and
Carneiro, Meghir, and Parey (2013) use tuition as an instrument to predict college attendance.
One concern to use tuition as an instrument is that the variable is highly correlated with
quality of the university (Cameron and Heckman, 2001). If the measure captures both costs of
college attendance and college qualities, it directly aects dierences in wage. To mitigate this
concern, I only include entrance fees and course fees of prefectural and municipal universities
in the tuition measure. Because these fees are specified by the national and local governments,
each university is not permitted to change the amount of these fees. In Japan, new enrollments
of university need to pay entrance fees, course fees, and other fees for school expenses.14 Before
2003, entrance fees and course fees of national universities are specified by the national gov-
ernment.15 Based on the amount of the fees of national universities, the fees of prefectural and
municipal universities are regulated by a local government or a governmental agency. There-
fore, entrance and course fees of public universities are determined at local government level
and basically reflect a variation at the prefecture level. I do not include other fees in public tu-
ition because each university is allowed to determine the amount of such fees at the department
level. The same thing applies to the tuition of private universities. It varies from university to
university, and thus might reflect the quality of the university. I exclude the tuition of national
universities from the public tuition measure because it was unified over the country until 2003.
The dierences in tuition of national universities are captured by the cohort dummies.
Using the local tuition at prefecture level presume that the variable matters for the schooling
choice of the individual. One could argue that individuals might move to a dierent prefecture
for their university education to avoid high tuition costs of local public universities (Carneiro,
Meghir, and Parey, 2013). However, it appears reasonable to consider that prefectural variation
matters in Japan. Because prefectural and municipal universities usually set lower price of
tuition for intra-regional students, movers are not only prevented from the option of living at
home, but also disadvantaged for a higher tuition for extra-regional students.
3.3.2.3 Local Labor Market Conditions
Third, I use labor market conditions as instruments for university enrollment decision. I use
the active job opening to application ratio and the annual average monthly total cash earnings
in the prefecture of residence at age 15. Local labor market conditions are used as instruments
by Cameron and Heckman (1998), and followed by Cameron and Taber (2004), Arkes (2010),
Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2010, 2011), Carneiro, Meghir, and Parey (2013), among
others.
I construct these measures as three years averaged over high school period and merge them
14Other fees contain, for example, training fees, fees for facilities and equipment.
15In 2004, national universities are incorporated by the the National University Corporation Act (Kokuritsu
Daigaku Hojin Ho).
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to the individual data at the year of individual was 18 years old. I presume that local earnings
capture temporary shocks to family income. Local job openings reflect the speed of job tran-
sitions or of finding a job if unemployed, and thus it also is related to temporary variation in
family resources. In addition, local earnings might capture foregone earnings as opportunity
costs of an additional schooling. A potential problem of using local labor market conditions is
that long-run trends of labor market conditions might aect both these measures and residential
choice at age 15. If local active job opening to application ratio and local earnings in high school
are correlated with the unobservables in the outcome equations, would not be a valid instrument.
To avoid this concern, I include averaged over 6 years trends of local labor market conditions at
age 13–18 in both selection and outcome equations to control for residential choice at the age of
15 and long-run dierences in labor market conditions of prefecture of residence in adolescent
years. In addition, I control for a set of dummy variables of the prefecture of residence at age
15, allowing for permanent or aggregate dierences in characteristics of the prefecture.
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for instruments with the outcomes and covariates. It
shows that individuals with some university education have, on average, higher wages than
those without university education. They have less years of experience in current job since they
have longer years of schooling. The dierence between the two groups is about 3.81 years of
schooling. Using this figure, all estimates of treatment eects reported below are annualized.
Individuals with some university education have more-educated parents, have smaller number of
siblings, and have lived in a prefecture where better labor market conditions in both adolescents
and the survey year. Their residence at the age of 15 was more likely to be in urban areas, to
be in a prefecture where has larger number of adolescents. They are less likely to come from
rural areas than those without university education. For instruments, individuals with some
university lived in a prefecture where has larger number of capacities of universities and better
labor market conditions when they were in high school or upper secondary education. However,
individuals with some university education were in a prefecture where costs, on average, higher
tuition of public universities than those without university education.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 First Stage Results
Table 3.2 presents the estimates of the selection model of university enrollment. I estimate the
logit model where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the individual
has ever attended university, and I report the marginal eects at the mean value of each variable.
All controls reported in the table perform well, and estimates show expected signs reported in
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the previous studies. For example, individuals who have parents with longer years of schooling
are more likely to enroll in university than those whose parents with lower levels of education.
The instruments are jointly strong predictors of university enrollment, though local active job
opening to application ratio (local job openings) is not individually significant. Local capacity
of universities is important determinant of university enrollment. If local capacities increase by
100 places, probability of university enrollment increases by about 1%. Local tuition in public
university also has statistically significant eects on university enrollment. If local tuition rises
by 10000 yen, it decreases university enrollment by about 0.6%. Local earnings play a role of an
opportunity cost variable of university enrollment. If local earnings averaged over high school
years increase by 1%, university enrollment decreases by about 2%. A better local active job
opening to application ratio at university enrollment increases probability of university enroll-
ment. The 0.1 point improvement of local active job opening to application ratio in high school
period increases probability of university enrollment by about 1.1%, but it has not statistically
significant eect.
3.4.2 OLS and IV Results
In Table 3.3, I present standard OLS and IV estimates to compare with the estimates in the
previous studies that use these methods. The OLS estimate shows that annualized returns to
university education is about 5.32%. One could argue that the magnitude of the OLS estimate
in this study is much smaller than the estimates derived in the previous studies using Japanese
micro-data. These studies report about 7 to 11% of OLS estimates of returns to schooling
(e.g. Tachibanaki, 1988; Trostel, Walker, and Woolley, 2002; Ono, 2004; Sano and Yasui, 2009;
Yasui and Sano, 2009; Nakamuro and Inui, 2012). The dierences in magnitude of the estimates
between their results and my result might be explained by dierences in sample restriction and
in control variables. There are three main dierences. First, I only use male observations.
Trostel, Walker, andWoolley (2002), Sano and Yasui (2009), and Yasui and Sano (2009) suggest
larger magnitude of the returns for female. Including female observations may provide larger
estimates of returns to schooling. I exclude female from the analysis to avoid the selection bias
in labor market participation. Second, I consider binary treatment of university enrollment, thus
exclude the individuals with less than upper secondary education. It is possible to consider a
model with multiple levels of treatment or with a continuous treatment of schooling, but it needs
more restrictions and additional instruments to identify the treatment parameters of interest.16
Finally, I include variables of local labor market conditions in the survey year when estimating
the model. Because the analysis data are based on pooled cross-section data sets, controlling for
current labor market conditions relieve sampling biases. These controls are not included in the
previous studies. Controlling for these variables might weaken the magnitude of the coecient
16See, for example, Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006), Heckman and Vytlacil (2007), and Florens et al.
(2008).
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of university enrollment.
Table 3.3 shows that the IV estimate of returns to university education is 10.67%. In the line
with the literature, the IV estimate is larger than the OLS estimate. Card (2001) suggests that
such a finding indicates returns to schooling are heterogeneous and higher for the individuals
who are induced to enroll in university by the changes in the instruments than those who have
average returns. This interpretation is related to the LATE parameter of Imbens and Angrist
(1994). However, the IV estimates do not necessary reflect the original LATE parameter if
instruments are multiple and the model includes a set of controls, which is the case of this
study.17 Interpreting an IV estimate is not always straightforward. Even if it shows LATE, it
indicates the policy eect of interest only if the variation of the instrument corresponds exactly
to the policy variation (Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil, 2006; Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil,
2011).
3.4.3 Marginal, Average and Policy Relevant Eects
In Figure 3.1, I estimate the MTE assuming joint normality of (U1, U0, V ) and plot it with
90% confidence interval bands.18 The MTE is monotonically declining as UD increases, and it
suggests substantial heterogeneity of marginal eects of university education. When the UD is
particularly low, for individuals who are more likely to enroll in university, the marginal eects
are high: about 31.1%, but for those who have low values of UD, the eects are substantially
low:  12.6%. They incur negative gain from attending university. Carneiro, Heckman, and
Vytlacil (2011) note that these results imply individuals self-select university enrollment based
on their comparative advantage with respect to their gains.
The IV and MTE estimates suggest that university education has substantial and heteroge-
neous eects on future pecuniary outcome. Yet, it is not clear how large the average impacts for
the dierent subpopulations, and how these eects are related to educational policies. To exam-
ine these issues, I show the treatment eects parameters in Table 3.3, which are constructed from
the MTE using the weights presented in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and Carneiro, Heckman,
and Vytlacil (2010, 2011).
Average eects are substantially dierent by the groups of population. The ATE shows an
additional year of university education increases hourly wage by 6.74%. The ATT is larger than
the ATE. It suggests that a return to one year of university education is 11.59% for those who
enrolled in university. The ATU is much smaller than the ATE and the ATT. It shows the eect
is 2.79% for those who did not enroll in university, which they would gain if they had enrolled
in university.
Conventional average treatment parameters are important themselves, but these only ad-
17See Angrist and Imbens (1995) and Heckman and Urzua (2010) for their discussion about identification and
interpretation of IV estimates.
18To depict the MTE, I evaluate it at mean values of control variables.
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dress policy questions in extreme cases. For example, the ATU indicates the eects of a policy
forcing entire population to receive university education. In contrast, the MPRTE parameter of
Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2010, 2011) answers questions about the marginal gains of
specific policies in more general case. Table 3.3 presents estimates of dierent definitions of
the MPRTE, where the policy is considered as a marginal change in probability of university
enrollment. The MPRTE with a policy that increases the probability of university enrollment
by an amount , is 7.18%. A policy that changes the probability of university enrollment by the
proportion (1+ ) provides slightly smaller eects. The MPRTE of such a policy is 5.39%, but
standard errors are large.
Finally, I calculate the average returns for those who are induced to enroll in university by a
particular policy shift. Table 3.3 reports the PRTE of two counter-factual policies: (1) a policy
of free tuition in public universities, (2) a policy that increases capacities of university by 1000
places if the prefecture has less than 5000 places. The PRTE of free public tuition shows the
eect is 6.47%, which is similar to the magnitude of the ATE. The PRTE of increasing capacities
suggests a larger impact, 7.78%.
3.5 Conclusion
This study investigates the returns to schooling of university education in Japan. I create instru-
ments reflecting the direct costs of college attendance: total accredited capacities of all univer-
sities and public tuition in the prefecture of residence at the age of 15. This measure captures
cross-time and cross-prefecture variation, because I also control for a set of birth cohorts and
prefecture dummies. Using local capacities of universities, public tuition, and local labor mar-
ket conditions as instruments, this study recovers the average eects of university education as
weighted averages of the MTE. The result shows that additional university schooling increases
the hourly wage, on average, 6.74% for population. In addition, this study finds heterogeneous
marginal eect by individual and heterogeneous average eects by the groups of subpopulation.
Average eect for those enrolled in university is 11.59%, but the eect is less than 3% for those
who did not enroll in.
This study further investigates the eect of university education for those who are induced
to enroll in university by a specific policy change. I find that policies increasing probability of
university enrollment provide positive eects of university education.
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Data Appendix
This appendix describes the construction of the instrumental variables. The data source for
capacity of universities is Zenkoku Daigaku Ichiran. This book is published with the list of all
accredited national, prefectural, municipal and private universities in each academic year by the
Bunkyo Kyokai. It contains the detailed information on the accredited capacities, the location,
and the date of opening and closing by the department of the university. I collected the total
quota for new enrollment oered in each prefecture of an academic year in the department level.
If the department is located in more than one prefecture, I take the prefecture where students
of the department stay in longer. If general education courses are collectively oered in the
other prefecture, I assign each department to the prefecture where they oer an upper-level or a
specialized course. I exclude the universities that oer only in correspondence, Internet learning
and a graduate school. I also exclude following categories of departments: art, music, religious,
home economics, and physical education. An important problem is the conversion of female to
co-ed universities. Zenkoku Daigaku Ichiran provides the information on conversion of single-
sex to co-ed in university or college level, but not in department level. I search the history of
the university in the ocial web cite or in an ocial report published by the university, and
I identify the department started to oer courses to male. If I am unable to identify which
department was changed to co-ed, I assume that all departments oer co-ed courses based on
the information of Zenkoku Daigaku Ichiran.
Tuition data are based on Keisetsu Jidai in 1972-2000 published by Obunsha. I define tu-
ition is sum of entrance fees and course fees. Some prefectural and municipal universities have
price discrimination by residential area of students. I assign minimum price of tuition for intra-
regional students if prefectural or municipal universities are available and assign maximum
price of tuition for extra-regional students if there is no prefectural or municipal universities in
the prefecture of residence at the age of 15. I construct the measure as accredited capacities
weighted averages over prefectural and municipal universities in a prefecture, or at the regional
level if prefectural and municipal universities are not available. The region is based on the def-
inition of region code of the Labor Force Survey (Rodo-Ryoku Chosa) of the Statistics Bureau
of the Ministry of Internal Aairs and Communications.
The active job opening to application ratio (yuko kyujin bairitsu) is based on the report on
employment service (shokugyou antei gyoumu toukei) of the Bureau of Employment Security
of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. It is defined as number of active job openings
per number of active applications. I use the ratio that excludes new graduates and part-timers. I
construct average local earnings in high school years from the annual average monthly total cash
earnings (establishments with 30 employees or more) of the Monthly Labor Survey (Maigetsu
Kinro Tokei Chosa). Local earning is evaluated at the 2005 consumer prices and transform it in
logarithm.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variables High school University
(D = 0) (D = 1)
Years of scholing 12.3299 16.1439
(0.7384) (0.6304)
Log hourly wage 7.4813 7.7428
(0.5436) (0.5369)
Control Variables
Years of current job experience 13.3465 12.5917
(9.1970) (7.9454)
Local log earnings in survey year 12.7634 12.8029
(0.1032) (0.1064)
Local unemployment rate 4.6543 4.6229
in survey year (in %) (0.9872) (0.9839)
Mother’s years of schooling 10.0539 11.4722
(2.2403) (2.2391)
Father’s years of schooling 10.1556 12.2285
(2.5825) (3.0751)
Number of siblings 1.6836 1.3527
(1.0304) (0.8185)
Urban residence at age 15 0.0871 0.1937
(0.2822) (0.3955)
Rural residence at age 15 0.4346 0.2575
(0.4960) (0.4375)
Local population of age 15–19 28.5065 34.4926
(in 10000) (22.3170) (25.8994)
Local log earnings at age 13–18 12.5964 12.6493
(0.2311) (0.2265)
Local job openings at age 13–18 1.0370 1.0819
(0.7304) (0.7093)
Instrumental Variables
Capacity of universities 11.0961 17.3315
(in 1000) (18.4653) (26.8027)
Tuition in public universities 25.0574 25.9429
(in 10000) (18.3435) (17.7490)
Local log earnings in high school 12.6435 12.6926
(0.1996) (0.1971)
Local job openings in high school 1.0296 1.0402
(0.7328) (0.7067)
Number of observations 964 862
Notes: This table reports summary statistics of the analysis data. Local job openings indicate the active
job opening to application ratio. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
72
Table 3.2: University Enrollment Decision
Dependent variable: University Enrollment
Control Variables
Father’s years of schooling 0.0332
(0.0074)
Mother’s years of schooling 0.0421
(0.0091)
Number of siblings -0.0819
(0.0163)
Urban residence at age 15 0.1167
(0.0486)
Rural residence at age 15 -0.0825
(0.0272)
Local population of age 15-19 -0.0113
(in 10000) (0.0047)
Local log earnings at age 13-18 1.7652
(0.9886)
Local job openings at age 13-18 -0.1306
(0.0845)
Instrumental Variables
Capacity of universities 0.1078
(in 1000) (0.0044)
Tuition in public universities -0.0060
(in 10000 yen) (0.0020)
Local log earnings in high school -2.0409
(0.8869)
Local job openings in high school 0.1120
(0.0814)
Test for joint significance of IVs
Chi-square 18.61
p-value 0.0009
Notes: This table reports the marginal eects evaluated at the mean value of each variable from a logit re-
gression of university enrollment (a dummy variable that is equal to one if an individual has ever attended
university, and equal to zero if he has never attended university but has completed upper secondary ed-
ucation). Local job openings indicate the active job opening to application ratio. Cohort dummies and
a set of dummies for prefecture of residence at the age of 15 are also controlled in the model but not
reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Chi-square and p-values indicate the results of the
test of joint significance of coecients on the instrumental variables.
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Table 3.3: Estimates of Returns to a Year of University Education
Parameters
OLS 0.0532
(0.0059)
IV 0.1067
(0.0499)
ATE 0.0674
(0.0370)
ATT 0.1159
(0.0637)
ATU 0.0279
(0.0453)
MPRTE
P = P +  0.0718
(0.0393)
P = (1 + )P 0.0539
(0.0367)
PRTE
Free tuition 0.0647
(0.0373)
Increase in 0.0778
capacities of universities (0.0403)
Notes: This table reports estimates of returns to university education for the normal selection model:
average treatment eect (ATE), average treatment on the treated (ATT), average treatment on the un-
treated (ATU), the marginal policy relevant treatment eect (MPRTE), and policy relevant treatment
eect (PRTE). The PRTE corresponds to the two counter-factual policies: (1) Free tuition: a policy of
free tuition in public universities, (2) Increase in capacities of universities: a policy that increases ca-
pacities of universities by 1000 places if the prefecture has less than 5000 places. The IV estimate uses
P(Z ) as the instrument (Logit model for first stage with all instruments). Standard errors (in parentheses)
are obtained by the bootstrap method (250 replications). All estimates are annualized (divided by 3.81
years).
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Chapter 4
Intergenerational Transmission of
Education in Japan
4.1 Introduction
The education of parents is one of the fundamental factors in explaining the child’s educational
success. Empirical studies of social science pay much attention to the intergenerational cor-
relation between parents’ education and child’s education. The recent literature advances the
analysis to quantify the causal eects of parents’ schooling in addition to obtaining precise
estimates of the correlation.
To estimate the causal impact, the literature depends on the identification strategies that
use identical twins, adopted children, and instrumental variables (IV). However, as Holmlund,
Lindahl, and Plug (2011) point out, dierent strategies provide dierent results. Hence, these
studies do not reach a consensus on the magnitude of the eects.1
In Japan, previous empirical studies also find a significant positive correlation between par-
ents’ schooling and child’s schooling.2 Unfortunately, these studies have paid limited attention
to the causal relationship. Researchers require micro-data sets that contain twins, adopted chil-
dren or plenty of information about individual characteristics to estimate the causal eects.
However, it is dicult to access such data sets in Japan.3 This limited accessibility to infor-
mative micro-data sets prevents researchers from controlling individual heterogeneity, and it
magnifies the inevitable concern for point identification under strong assumptions on treatment
selection. For this reason, I derive sets of nonparametric bounds under relatively weak and
testable assumptions that appear to share broad consensus in the literature.
In the empirical field of social science, the credibility of mean-independence or exogenous
1See also Black and Devereux (2011) for a survey.
2For example, see Tachibanaki (1988) and Yamada (2011). See also Kariya (2001) as an example of sociologi-
cal research on the relationship between educational attainment and family background.
3Nakamuro and Inui (2012) are one of the exceptions. They collect twin data through a web-based survey.
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treatment conditions is usually a matter of considerable disagreement. Furthermore, it is dif-
ficult to find a variable that satisfies the IV assumption. If the identification assumption on
the exogenous treatment is not valid, a simple regression coecient provides a biased estimate
of the causal eect. Manski (1997) and Manski and Pepper (1998, 2000) introduce the non-
parametric bound analysis under a set of monotonicity assumptions. They show that even if
the strong assumptions for point identification are not satisfied, relatively weak assumptions
can eectively tighten the bounds on the causal eect of the treatment. In recent years, the
number of studies applying a nonparametric bounding method has been growing (e.g. Blundell
et al., 2007; Gonzalez, 2005; Gundersen and Kreider, 2009; Kreider and Hill, 2009; Kreider
and Pepper, 2007; Lee and Wilke, 2009; Okumra and Usui, 2010).4 De Haan (2011) uses the
nonparametric bound method to examine the eects of parents’ schooling on child’s school-
ing. With the U.S. data, she shows that mother’s or father’s college degree has a positive eect
on child’s schooling. Moreover, the estimated bounds are significantly dierent from zero but
substantially lower than the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates.
Most of the studies on causal eect of parents’ education on the child’s education, includ-
ing De Haan (2011), have focused on the eect of a single treatment of each of the parents.
However, the estimated eect might not be the treatment eect of interest in the single treat-
ment framework. The estimated eect of a parental schooling includes both the direct transfer
from the given parent and the indirect transfer from the other parent due to assortative mating
eects. On the other hand, the studies using the regression method control a variable of spousal
education as an additional regressor, but usually ignore the endogeneity of the variable.5
As Holmlund, Lindahl, and Plug (2011) note, it is not clear whether spousal education
should be controlled in the analysis, and if so, how this may be done, because the strong positive
correlation of father’s and mother’s schooling makes it dicult to interpret the coecient for
each parent separately. Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens (2006) propose an alternative way to
control spousal education. They use the sum of mother’s and father’s completed education
as the explanatory variable instead of including each parent’s education separately. It allows
directly estimating the eect of a one-year increase in either parent’s schooling. However, the
specification assumes that the eects of father’s and mother’s education are the same. It is also
not clear that the assumption is satisfied in general.
In practice, children are exposed to a combination of multiple treatments of mother’s and
father’s educational level rather than exposed to a single treatment of each parent’s educational
4See Manski (2003) and Manski and Pepper (2009) for a review.
5An advantage of using the regression method is that parental income can also be included as a control. This
helps to understand the mechanisms by which parent’s education aects the child’s education, because parental
education has both a direct impacts through generating dierences in the quality of child’s endowments and an
indirect impacts of higher quantity or quality of inputs due to the positive eect of parent’s education on the family
income (Chevalier et al., 2013). Because the data set does not contain precise information on parental income
during the adolescent years, I am unable to control parental income in the analysis. Therefore, the analyzed eects
include the indirect impact of parent’s education on the child’s education.
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level, at least biological meanings. Therefore, it is natural to consider a set of treatments of
both parents’ schooling simultaneously. A specification of multiple treatments avoids the dis-
cussion about the proper way to control the spousal eects, but directly evaluates the eects of
a combination of both parents’ schooling. Furthermore, it allows the heterogeneous eects of
each parent’s schooling. Unfortunately, very little is known about the eects of a combination
of father’s and mother’s schooling as an application of the evaluation method with multiple
treatments.
This study contributes to the literature by assessing the treatment eect of a combination of
parents’ schooling on the child’s schooling in Japan using a nonparametric bounds approach.
To do so, I consider a set of treatment vectors of mother’s and father’s education and assume
that the treatment takes semi-ordered multiple values. In the analysis, rather than imposing the
strong assumptions required to obtain point estimates, I rely on a set of monotonicity and semi-
monotonicity assumptions to acquire informative bounds. The assumptions are the monotone
treatment response (MTR) of Manski (1997), the monotone selection (MTS), and the monotone
instrumental variables (MIV) of Manski and Pepper (1998, 2000).
The main results show that the tightest bounds on the average eects of parents’ schooling
are positive, but lower than the point estimates that rely on the assumption on exogenous selec-
tion of parents’ schooling. These results suggest that the regression estimates that are mainly
provided in the previous Japanese studies have an upward bias from the true causal eect of
parents’ schooling.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 defines the parameter of
interest and describes the identification assumptions. Section 4.3 explains the data set. Section
4.4 shows and discusses the results. Finally, Section 4.5 presents the conclusions.
4.2 Method
This study employs a nonparametric technique to obtain the bounds on the causal eect of
parents’ education on child’s education. I basically follow the setup of Manski and Pepper
(2000). There is a probability space (J, 
, P) of individuals. Each member j of population J
has observable covariates x j 2 X and a response function y j () : T ! Y mapping the mutually
exclusive and exhaustive treatments t 2 T into real-valued outcomes y j (t) 2 Y , where the
treatment T is the level of schooling that the parent completed, thus assumed to be an ordered
set. Y is years of schooling or university graduation of the child j, and x = (w;v); X =
W  V . Each value of (w;v) defines an observable sub-population of children. I assume that
the outcome space Y has the greatest lower bound Ymin  min Y and the least upper bound
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Ymax  max Y .6
Child j has a realized treatment z j 2 T and a realized outcome y j  y j (z j ), both of which
are observable. The latent outcomes y j (t); t , z j are not observable. A researcher learns the
distribution P(x, z, y) of covariates, realized treatments and realized outcomes by observing a
random sample of the population. To simplify the notation, the subscript j will be dropped
except when it required.
The parameter of interest is the average treatment eect (ATE) between parental levels of
education t 2 T and t0 2 T; s:t: t > t0:
ATE(t; t0)  E[y(t)   y(t0)] = E[y(t)]   E[y(t0)]: (4.1)
The linearity of expectations provides the second equality. The empirical problem comes
down to learning the E[y()] from the empirical evidence of the the distribution P(x; z; y) of
covariates, realized treatments and realized outcomes with assumptions. The fact that E[y jz =
t] = E[y(t) jz = t] and the law of iterated expectations gives,
E[y(t)] = E[y jz = t]  Pr (z = t) + E[y(t) jz , t]  Pr (z , t): (4.2)
With a data set, researchers can estimate E[y jz = t];Pr (z = t);Pr (z , t), but they cannot
estimate E[y(t) jz , t] without adding any assumptions. Manski (1989, 1990) shows that no
assumption (worst case) bounds on E[y(t)] can be identified if the support of the dependent
variable is bounded:
E[y jz = t]  Pr (z = t) + Ymin  Pr (z , t)
 E[y(t)]  (4.3)
E[y jz = t]  Pr (z = t) + Ymax  Pr (z , t):
The width of bounds is (Ymax   Ymin)  Pr (z , t), thus the bounds are informative if
Pr (z , t) < 1. These bounds on E[y()] provide the lower (upper) bound on the ATE(t; t0)
by subtracting the upper (lower) bound on E[y(t0)] from the lower (upper) bound on E[y(t)].
Hence the identification region H fg for the ATE is the interval:
6When I analyze the eects on child’s years of schooling, I assume Ymin = 9 and Ymax = 18 years of schooling
from the construction of the data set.
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H fE[y(t)]   E[y(t0)]g
= fE[y jz = t]  Pr (z = t) + Ymin  Pr (z , t)   E[y jz = t0]  Pr (y = t0) + Ymax  Pr (z , t0);
E[y jz = t]  Pr (y = t) + Ymax  Pr (z , t)   E[y jz = t0]  Pr (z = t0) + Ymin  Pr (z , t0)g:
This interval contains the value zero. Its width is (Ymax Ymin) [Pr (z , t)+Pr (z , t0)]. The
no assumption bounds are important as a beginning because these bounds include all results that
depend on dierent assumptions about E[y(t) jz , t]. However, the no assumption bounds are
too wide to obtain an informative result in this study. Therefore, some additional assumptions
are necessary to tighten the bounds. In the remainder of this section, I explain how assumptions
tighten the bounds. I consider the exogenous treatment selection (ETS) assumption and the
following three assumptions: (1) the MTR, (2) the MTS and (3) the MIV. In addition, I apply
the semi-monotonicity version of these three assumptions.
4.2.1 Exogenous Treatment Selection
The ETS assumes that the realized treatment z is statistically independent of the latent outcomes
y(), and can be expressed as:
For each t 2 T;and all (u1;u2) 2 T  T
E[y(t) jz = u1] = E[y(t) jz = u2]: (4.4)
or
E[y(t)] = E[y jz = t]: (4.5)
Under the ETS assumption, the parameter of interest becomes: E[y jz = t]   E[y jz = t0].
The ETS assumption or covariates x conditional version of it, E[y(t) jx] = E[y jz = t; x], is
implicitly imposed in much of the empirical literature. This assumption implies that treatments
are assigned randomly to the population and excludes the existence of heterogeneous treatment
eects with essential heterogeneity (Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil, 2006). It does not seem
to be appropriate in the intergenerational transmission of education. For example, one could
consider a situation that parents received dierent educational levels because they dier sub-
stantially from one another, but this heterogeneity is unobservable by the researchers. If the
heterogeneity also determines child’s schooling, the realized treatment is endogenous in the
analysis. Moreover, it is dicult to use micro-data sets with plenty of information on individual
characteristics in Japan. In that case, the researchers cannot fully control the heterogeneity, thus
endogenous selection of parents’ education violates the ETS assumption.
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However, one advantage of assuming the ETS is that it yields point identification. The ETS
estimates are equivalent to the coecients obtained by regression child’s education on dummy
variables for each parental educational level and no other covariates. This study shows the point
estimates under the ETS assumption for comparison with bounds estimates.
4.2.2 Monotone Treatment Response
Manski (1997) proposes the MTR assumption that states response functions are weakly increas-
ing. That is,
For each j 2 J and all (t1; t2) 2 T  T s:t: t1  t2,
t1  t2 ) y j (t1)  y j (t2): (4.6)
TheMTR assumes that an increasing parents’ schooling does not decrease the child’s school-
ing. The validity of this assumption is suggested in the literature. For instance, the human
capital theory (Becker, 1975; Becker and Tomes, 1979; Solon, 1999) suggests a positive impact
of increasing parents’ schooling on child’s schooling. Empirical studies of returns to school-
ing show that an additional year of schooling has positive eects on both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary outcomes (Card, 1999; Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011). The higher average income
of highly educated parents makes investment in education easier with credit constraints. More
educated parents more likely use their time for their children (Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney,
2008). It is worth noting that the MTR assumption does not exclude zero eect of parental ed-
ucation. It allows the case that the positive correlation between parents’ schooling and child’s
schooling has no causal relationship.
Manski (1997) shows that the MTR assumption tightens the no assumption bound,7
t < z j ) Ymin  y j (t)  y j ;
t = z j ) y j (t) = y j ; (4.7)
t > z j ) y j  y j (t)  Ymax :
7For a full derivation of the MTR bounds, see Manski (1997).
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thus,
E[y jz  t]  Pr (z  t) + Ymin  Pr (z > t)
E[y(t)]  (4.8)
Ymax  Pr (z < t) + E[y jz  t]  Pr (z  t):
4.2.3 Monotone Treatment Selection
Manski and Pepper (1998, 2000) weaken equation 4.4 to an inequality and yield the MTS as-
sumption:
For each t 2 T and all (u1;u2) 2 T  T s:t: u1  u2
u1  u2 ) E[y(t) jz = u1]  E[y(t) jz = u2]: (4.9)
If the MTS assumption holds, then,
u < t ) Ymin  E[y(t) jz = u]  E[y jz = t]
u = t ) E[y(t) jz = u] = E[y jz = t] (4.10)
u > t ) E[y jz = t]  E[y(t) jz = u]  Ymax :
It follows that
Ymin  Pr (z < t) + E[y jz = t]  Pr (z  t)
E[y(t)]  (4.11)
E[y jz = t]  Pr (y  t) + Ymax  Pr (z > t):
Manski and Pepper (1998, 2000) also show that combining the MTR and the MTS assump-
tions can have substantial identifying power.8 Let the MTR and the MTS assumptions 4.6 and
4.9 hold. Then, bounds reduce to
8For a full derivation of the MTS and the MTR-MTS bounds, see Manski and Pepper (1998, 2000).
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E[y jz < t]  Pr (z < t) + E[y jz = t]  Pr (z  t)
 E[y(t)]  (4.12)
E[y jz = t]  Pr (z  t) + E[y jz > t]  Pr (z > t):
If I invoke the interpretation of Manski and Pepper (1998, 2000), the MTS assumption
indicates that parents who select higher levels of schooling have a weakly higher mean response
function than those who select lower levels. It implies that a genetic transmission of unobserved
ability from parents to children provides the correlation of educational levels. Researchers
commonly assume that unmeasured inherent dierences are key source of endogeneity of the
education. Therefore, the MTS assumption is consistent with the arguments in the literature.
Furthermore, Manski and Pepper (1998, 2000) suggest a simple test for the validity of the joint
MTR-MTS assumption. Under the assumption,
For all (u1;u2) 2 T  T; s:t: u1  u2;
E[y jz = u1] = E[y(u1) jz = u1]  E[y(u1) jz = u2]  E[y(u2) jz = u2] = E[y jz = u2]: (4.13)
The MTS assumption implies the first inequality and the MTR assumption gives the second
inequality. Under this hypothesis, E(y jz = u) must be a weakly increasing function of u. Hence
the researcher should reject the hypothesis if the mean outcomes of the child’s education are not
weakly increasing in the realized level of schooling of the parent.
4.2.4 Monotone Instrumental Variables
The recent literature of causal intergenerational schooling eects has moved away from es-
timating OLS under the ETS assumption, and relies on alternative identification assumptions
(Holmlund, Lindahl, and Plug, 2011). One of the assumptions is the IV. Using the notation in
the present paper, the familiar mean-independence form of the IV assumption can be written as,
For each t 2 T and all (u1;u2) 2 V  V ,
E[y(t) jv = u1] = E[y(t) jv = u2]: (4.14)
If the treatment eects are homogeneous, the IV estimator recovers the parameter of interest.
Even if the eects are heterogeneous, researchers can recover the parameter of interest or a
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related interpretable parameter using an IV with additional assumptions on a selection model.9
Unfortunately, it is hard to find an IV that satisfies the mean-independence conditions. Instead of
assuming mean-independence, Manski and Pepper (1998, 2000) introduce a weaker assumption
to replace the equality in 4.14 by an inequality, yielding a weakly monotone relation between
the instrumental variable and the mean response function.
For each t 2 T and all (u1;u2) 2 V  V ,
u1  u2 ) E[y(t) jv = u1]  E[y(t) jv = u2]: (4.15)
In the case that the MIV assumption holds, the bounds to be:
X
u2V
Pr (v = u) 
(
maxu1u

E[y jz = t;v = u1]Pr (z = t jv = u1) + Ymin  Pr (z , t jv = u1))
 E[y(t)]  (4.16)X
u2V
Pr (v = u) 
(
minu2u

E[y jz = t;v = u2]Pr (z = t jv = u2) + Ymax  Pr (z , t jv = u2)):
The MIV and the MTR-MTS assumptions make distinct contributions to the identification.
Manski and Pepper (1998, 2000) suggest that combining the MIV and the MTR-MTS assump-
tions yields particularly interesting bounds.10
X
u2V
Pr (v = u) 
(
maxu1u

E[y jz < t;v = u1]  Pr (z < t jv = u1)
+ E[y jz = t;v = u1]  Pr (z  t jv = u1))
 E[y(t)]  (4.17)X
u2V
Pr (v = u) 
(
minu2u

E[y jz = t;v = u2]  Pr (z  t jv = u2)
+ E[y jz > t;v = u2]  Pr (z > t jv = u2)):
9See Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) for more details.
10For a full derivation of the MIV and the MTR-MTS-MIV bounds, see Manski and Pepper (1998, 2000).
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4.2.5 Semi-Monotone Instrumental Variables
Manski and Pepper (1998) also suggest the ways to combine multiple scalars of IV or MIV
assumptions. In this study, I use two MIVs simultaneously to tighten the bounds. To do so, I
assume that the pair of MIVs, (va;vb) is a two-dimensional semi-monotone instrumental vari-
able (SMIV):
For each t 2 T and all [(ua1 ;ub1); (ua2 ;ub2)] 2 (V a  V b)  (V a  V b) s:t: ua1  ua2 and ub1  ub2
) E[y(t) j(va;vb) = (ua1 ;ub1)]  E[y(t) j(va;vb) = (ua2 ;ub2)]: (4.18)
In this assumption, a pair of MIVs is assumed to be semi-ordered rather than ordered be-
cause it includes some pairs of values that are not ordered.11 The MTR-MTS-MIV bounds in
4.17 can be extended to the MTR-MTS-SMIV bounds if the maxima and minima operations
are taken over pairs of values that are ordered.
4.2.6 Semi-Monotone Treatment Response
The previous studies of the eect of parent’s schooling on child’s schooling have focused on the
identification of a single treatment of one parent and have estimated the eect of mother’s and
father’s schooling severally. By constrast, children are aected by a combination of both par-
ents’ levels of education in practice. This indicates that the treatment of parents’ schooling are
multiple for the child. In this study, I analyze eects of both parents’ schooling simultaneously
in the framework of the nonparametric bounding approach.12
Manski (1997) proposes the assumption of semi-monotone treatment response (SMTR)
where a semi-ordered vector of multi-valued treatments T exists. It suggests that the dis-
cussion based on the single ordered treatment of a parent’s schooling can be extended to a
semi-ordered vector of multiple treatments, which is a combination of each parent’s schooling.
This study considers two-dimensional treatment vectors of mother’s and father’s schooling,
(tM ; tF ) = t 2 T. In this case, the SMTR assumption states:
For each j 2 J and all (t1; t2) 2 T  T s:t: t1  t2,
t1  t2 ) y j (t1)  y j (t2): (4.19)
11For example, consider a case that ua1 < u
a
2 and u
b
1 > u
b
2 . It does not predict the ordering of E[y(t) j(va ;vb ) =
(ua
k
;ub
k
)]; k = 1;2.
12The matching approach is an alternative method to analyze multiple treatments. For example, see Imbens
(2000); Lechner (2001). See also Flores and Mitnik (2013) as an example applying the dierence-in-dierence
method for multiple treatments. Frölich (2004) is a comprehensive survey of the analysis on multiple treatments.
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where I define t1  t2 i f and only i f tM1  tM2 and tF1  tF2 .
The analysis under the MTR assumption still holds under the assumption of SMTR except
the case where treatments are not ordered:13
t < z j ) Ymin  y j (t)  y j ;
t = z j ) y j (t) = y j ; (4.20)
t > z j ) y j  y j (t)  Ymax :
t ? z j ) Ymin  y j (t)  Ymax :
where ? denotes that t and z are not ordered. Then, I have the following the SMTR bounds:
E[y jz  t]  Pr (z  t) + Ymin  Pr (z > t) + Ymin  Pr (z?t)
E[y(t)]  (4.21)
Ymax  Pr (z < t) + E[y jz  t]  Pr (z  t) + Ymax  Pr (z?t):
4.2.7 Semi-Monotone Treatment Selection
The SMIV assumption of Manski and Pepper (1998) suggests an assumption on selection with a
semi-ordered vector of multi-valued treatment. The semi-monotone treatment selection (SMTS)
assumption is the special SMIV assumption that the MIVs, v = (va;vb) are the realized treat-
ments z. With the SMTS assumption, the analysis under the MTS assumption is also available
except the case where treatments are not ordered. Therefore, I can get the SMTR-SMTS bounds
by combining the SMTR assumption and the SMTS assumption as well as the analysis on the
single treatment. Let the SMTR and the SMTS assumption hold.14 Then,
u < t ) Ymin  E[y jz = u]  E[y(t) jz = u]  E[y jz = t]
u = t ) E[y(t) jz = u] = E[y jz = t] (4.22)
u > t ) E[y jz = t]  E[y(t) jz = u]  E[y jz = u]  Ymax :
u ? t ) Ymin  y(t)  Ymax :
13For a full derivation of the SMTR bounds, see Manski (1997).
14For a full derivation MTR-MTS bounds and a further discussion on the semi-monotonicity assumptions, see
Manski (1997) and Manski and Pepper (1998).
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It follows that
E[y jz < t]  Pr (z < t) + E[y jz = t]  Pr (z  t) + Ymin  Pr (z?t)
 E[y(t)]  (4.23)
E[y jz = t]  Pr (z  t)+E[y jz > t]  Pr (z > t) + Ymax  Pr (z?t):
These bounds can be viewed as a natural extension of the MTR-MTS bounds. The bounds
can be combined with the MIV and the SMIV assumptions as well as the single treatment
bounds since the assumptions are not mutually exclusive.
4.3 Data
The main analysis data are the Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS).15 The JGSS are re-
peated cross-section data for men and women aged 20-89 on each survey date. This study
uses the surveys conducted in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2008, and 2010, and pools
the respondents from all waves. From the pooled original data, I exclude the observations by
following four steps.
First, I restrict the sample by their age. I exclude the people who were younger than 25 years
old on the survey year because they might not complete their academic schooling. Second, I
drop the individuals who answered that their father or mother was absent at the age of 15, be-
cause I am unable to control unobservable characteristics if parental structures are substantially
dierent between those with single parent and those with couple parents. Third, I only use the
observations who were born after 1940 because the current educational system was enacted af-
ter 1947. Finally, I use the individuals whose observational characteristics are available. So the
remained sample after the restrictions contains 13669 individuals were born in 1940–1984 and
were at the age of 25–69 on the date of survey.
For the educational attainment of the respondents (children) and their parents, I use the
information about the level of the last school attended and assign the standard years of schooling
in Japan. For children, completion of their last schooling is available. I follow Tanaka (2008),
reduce the number of years of education by one year from standard years for those who dropped
15The Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS) are designed and carried out by the JGSS Research Center at
Osaka University of Commerce (Joint Usage / Research Center for Japanese General Social Surveys accredited
by Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology), in collaboration with the Institute of Social
Science at the University of Tokyo.
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out before finishing their last school. To examine the robustness of the definition of the outcome
variable, I also use an indicator of university graduation.
In the analysis, I consider the following four schooling levels for parents: (1) Less than High
School denotes that the parent completes compulsory schooling or lower secondary education,
(2) High School denotes that the parent completes high school or upper secondary education, (3)
Some College denotes that the parent completes a college or a higher education, (4) University
denotes that the parent has a bachelor’s degree. I also use schooling of parent as an MIV. When
I obtain bounds on the eect of mother’s schooling, I use the indicator of father’s university
graduation as an MIV. For father’s schooling, the indicator of mother’s college graduation takes
on a role of an MIV.
Under the SMIV assumption, I use two additional dummy variables as MIVs. The first
additional MIV is a dummy variable of father’s “regular” worker status that takes one if the
father was an executive of a company or was an employee with non-terminable contract (joji-
koyo no rodosha) when the child was 15 years old. A father’s more stable working status
implies more stable parental income in the child’s adolescent years. It is natural to assume that
a child with more parental income is less likely to face credit constraints at the decision on
an additional schooling. The second additional MIV is a dummy variable that takes one if the
child was born after 1975. Taking the birth cohort as an MIV is equivalent to assuming that
children who were born in more recent years have weakly higher mean outcome functions than
those who were born in older years. This assumption can be attributed to the facts of decreasing
trends of number of children, non-decreasing trends of number of schools per child, and stable
non-decreasing trends of post compulsory school or university enrollment rate in recent years
in Japan. Table 4.1 gives some summary statistics.
4.4 Results
Before presenting the results of bounds on the ATE, I display that the combined assumption of
the MTR and the MTS cannot be rejected in the analysis data. Table 4.2 reports mean schooling
outcomes of children by educational level of parents. All variables show that the MTR-MTS
assumption is not rejected since average values of outcome variables are weakly increasing both
in the level of mother’s and father’s schooling.
4.4.1 Single Treatment Eects on Child’s Years of Schooling
I show the results of analyses on child’s years of schooling. Table 4.3 provides bounds on the
ATE of mother’s and father’s schooling on child’ years of schooling. Following Manski and
Pepper (1998, 2000), Gonzalez (2005), and Giustinelli (2011) all tables below also report the
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95% confidence intervals that obtained by percentile bootstrap of 3000 replications.
The column of the ETS assumption reports point estimates of the eects. The eect of the
change of mother’s schooling from junior high school to high school shows an increase in child’s
schooling by about 1.50 years. The corresponding eect of father’s schooling increases child’s
schooling by about 1.30 years. The change of mother’s schooling from high school to some
college increases child’s schooling by about 1.02 years. When increasing father’s schooling
from high school to some college, it increases child’s schooling by about 0.74 years. These
results suggest stronger eects of maternal education than paternal education on child’s years
of schooling. However, the ETS results of bachelor’s degree seem to be mixed. Compared
to college degree, mother’s bachelor degree has smaller eects than father’s bachelor degree.
When increasing mother’s schooling from junior high school to bachelor’s degree, it increases
child’s schooling by about 2.95 years. It is larger than the corresponding eect of father. When
increasing father’s schooling from junior high school to bachelor’s degree, it increases child’s
schooling by about 2.65 years.
It is clear from the columns (2) and (7), the no assumption bounds are extremely wide.
Imposing the MTR assumption increases significantly the lower bounds by the definition of
the assumption that implies non-negative eects (columns (3) and (8)). The MTS assumption
allows tightening upper and lower bounds compared to the no assumption bounds, but this
is not powerful enough to acquire information on the treatment eect (columns (4) and (9)).
The combination of the MTR and the MTS assumptions leads substantially tighter bounds than
imposing each assumption alone. Unfortunately, the MTR-MTS assumption cannot provide
informative results itself (columns (5) and (10)).
Table 4.3 also shows the bounds under the MIV assumption and combination of it. The MIV
assumption tightens upper and lower bounds compared to the no assumption bounds, but this
is not powerful enough to obtain informative bounds as well as the MTS assumption (columns
(11) and (15)). These results do not depend on the definition of the MIV (columns (12) and
(16)). The columns of (13), (14), (17) and (18) show the bounds under the MTR-MTS-MIV
assumption. The combination of these three assumptions leads to informative bounds. I get
upper bounds that are lower than the ETS results in some cases. The ETS point estimates fall
outside the confidence intervals when increasing parent’s schooling from junior high school to
university.
4.4.2 Single Treatment Eects on Child’s University Graduation
To examine the robustness of the results of Table 4.3, I estimate bounds on an alternative defi-
nition of outcomes. Table 4.4 displays the results of the eects on child’s university graduation.
The MTR, the MTS bounds are rather wide and not very informative, these are not shown in
Table 4.4.
In all levels of parental education, the ETS estimates show that additional years of schooling
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of a parent have significant impacts on probability of the child’s university graduation (columns
(1) and (2)). However, the MTR-MTS-MIV upper bounds suggest that the ETS estimates over-
state the ATE in some levels of parental education (columns (4), (5), (9), and (10)). The upper
bounds under the MTR-MTS-MIV assumption suggest much smaller eects of parent’s bach-
elor’s degree on child’s university graduation when I compare with the parent who completes
only compulsory education or lower secondary education. Unfortunately, the ETS estimates of
lower categories of parent’s schooling report very small eects. Even I impose the MTR-MTS-
MIV assumption, the upper bounds on the eects cannot exclude the small eects of the point
estimates in these levels of parents’ education.
4.4.3 Single Treatment Eects on Child’s Education under the SMIV as-
sumption
The results under the MTR-MTS-MIV assumption provide informative upper bounds since they
are substantially smaller than the point estimates obtained under the ETS assumption, but lower
bounds do not exclude zero eect of parent’s schooling on both years of schooling and proba-
bility of university graduation of the child. In this section, I use the two MIVs simultaneously
under the SMIV assumption instead of using the schooling of the other parent and father’s
regular job variable separately.
Panel A of Table 4.5 provides the eects on child’s years of schooling. It shows that SMIV
assumption gives very informative bounds (columns (5)). The upper bounds are lower than the
MTR-MTS-MIV bounds and indicate that both mother’s and father’s college degree increases
child’s schooling by about 1.41 years. The upper bounds results of a change of parent’s school-
ing from junior high school to bachelor’s degree show that the mother’s university graduation
increases child’s schooling by about 2.09 years and the father’s university graduation increases
child’s schooling by about 2.12 years. These upper bounds are substantially lower than the
estimates under the ETS assumption.
Combining the two MIVs also plays an important role to tighten the lower bounds. For
both mother’s and father’s schooling, the results show that the eect of an increase in parent’s
schooling to a college degree or more has an impact on child’s schooling that is significantly
dierent from zero. For example, a change of mother’s schooling from junior high school to
bachelor’s degree provides an increase in child’s schooling by about 0.39 years. The father’s
bachelor’s degree increases child’s schooling by about 0.43 years.
Panel B of Table 4.5 shows the eects on the probability of child’s university graduation.
The results using this outcome variable are very similar to the results using child’s years of
schooling as the outcome variable. The MTR-MTS-SMIV bounds give not only more infor-
mative upper bounds but also more informative lower bounds (column (10)). The results of
increasing father’s or mother’s schooling to a college degree or more has a positive eect on
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child’s university graduation that is statistically significantly dierent from zero, but substan-
tially lower than the point estimates under the assumption of ETS.
To summarize the estimated results, the combination of the MTR-MTS-MIV assumptions
provides informative bounds on the ATE of parent’s schooling on child’s schooling. The main
results show that the tightest upper bounds on the eects are lower than the point estimates
that rely on the ETS assumption. These results suggest that the regression estimates have an
upward bias from the true causal eect of parent’s schooling. The combination of the MTR-
MTS-SMIV assumptions also gives informative lower bounds, which suggest positive eects
of parental education on child’s education.
4.4.4 Multiple Treatment Eects on Child’s Years of Schooling and Uni-
versity Graduation
In this section, I provide the results of analyses on multiple treatments of both parents’ school-
ing. The partial identification approach discussed in the method section gives bounds on the
ATE of the multiple treatments under dierent semi-monotonicity assumptions as well as the
single treatment case. Table 4.6 shows the multiple treatments eects of parents’ schooling
on child’s schooling. The SMTR and the SMTS bounds are too wide to provide informative
results, these are not shown in the table.16
Panel A of Table 4.6 provides the eects on child’s years of schooling. I begin by examining
the estimated ATE under the assumption of ETS for a useful benchmark. Children whose par-
ents complete college or more education have about 2.27 longer years of schooling than those
whose parents complete high school or less education (column (1)). Compared to the point esti-
mates under the ETS assumption, the conservative no assumption bounds are [-4.3261 5.8333],
which are too wide to acquire information on the ATE of parents’ schooling (column (2)).
By combining dierent sets of assumptions, the results clearly illustrate more informative
bounds on the ATE. The estimated bounds are [0, 2.2697] under the SMTR-SMTS assumption
and [0, 2.1060] under the SMTR-SMTS-MIV assumption with an MIV of father’s regular job
or [0, 2.2388] with an MIV of the indicator of child was born after 1975 (columns (3), (4),
and (5)). These upper bounds are smaller than the estimates under the ETS assumption. While
both of these MIV assumptions substantially reduce the upper bounds, there still remains much
uncertainty about the lower bounds on the ATE. Under the combined SMTR-SMTS assumption
and SMIV assumption, the bounds narrow to [0.2397, 1.2077] and the confidence intervals are
(0.1913, 1.3243), which exclude zero (column (6)). Thus, a set of semi-monotonicity assump-
tions provides the non-negative impact of parents’ schooling on child’s schooling.
Panel B of Table 4.6 shows the eects on the probability of child’s university graduation.
16In this table, I only use the two levels of parents’ schooling (college degree or more and high school or less)
because the number of observations is too small to estimate with four levels of parents’ schooling.
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The results of this outcome variable are similar to the results of child’s years of schooling. Under
the ETS assumption, the point estimates indicate that children whose parents complete college
or more education are more likely graduate university than those whose parents complete high
school or less education (column (7)). The dierence in the probability is 42%. In comparison
with the point estimates under the ETS assumption, the conservative no assumption bounds are
[-30.17, 82.71]%, which include negative eects of parents’ schooling (column (8)).
The estimated bounds are [0, 42.00]% under the SMTR-SMTS assumption and [0, 38.39]%
under the SMTR-SMTS-MIV assumption with an MIV of father’s regular job or [0, 41.43]%
with an MIV of the indicator of the child was born after 1975 (columns ((9), (10), and (11)).
These upper bounds are smaller than the estimates under the ETS assumption. Under the
SMTR-SMTS-SMIV assumption, the bounds narrow to [4.54, 19.84]% and the confidence in-
tervals are (3.53, 22.69), which exclude zero (column (12)). It suggests that parents’ college
degrees are at least somewhat beneficial on child’s university graduation. However, this esti-
mated bound is strictly smaller than the point estimates under the assumption of the ETS, which
is sometimes implicitly assumed in the literature.
To summarize the estimated results, the combination of the semi-monotonicity assumptions
provides informative bounds on the ATE of parents’ schooling on child’s schooling in the mul-
tiple treatments framework. The main results show that the tightest upper bounds on the eects
are substantially lower than the point estimates that assume the ETS. These results suggest that
the regression estimates have an upward bias from the true causal eect of parents’ education.
The combination of the SMTR-SMTS-SMIV assumptions also gives informative lower bounds,
which suggest non-zero positive eects of parents’ education on child’s education.
4.5 Conclusion
Quantifying the causal eects of parents’ schooling on child’s schooling is a goal of the recent
empirical literature on intergenerational relation of education. Previous Japanese studies give
large, positive and statistically significant estimates by the OLS method. These studies implic-
itly assume that parents’ schooling is assigned randomly to the child. It does not seem to be
appropriate if unobserved heterogeneity determines both parents’ and child’s educational levels.
The main contributions of this study are twofold. First, this study estimates the causal
eects of parents’ schooling on child’s schooling in Japan using a nonparametric bounds analy-
sis. It provides the ATE bounds without relying on an invalid exogenous selection assumption.
Second, this study shows results of multiple treatments of both parents’ schooling as an ap-
plication of the nonparametric bounds method of multiple treatments evaluation. To obtain
informative bounds, this study imposes relatively weak and partially testable monotonicity and
semi-monotonicity assumptions on treatment response, selection, and instrumental variables.
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The tightest bounds under the combination of these three assumptions show that obtained
lower bounds on the ATE are positive and significantly dierent from zero, but upper bounds on
the ATE are lower than the point estimates that rely on the assumption on exogenous selection
of parents’ schooling. These results suggest that the previous studies using OLS overestimate
the true causal eect of parents’ education.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
mean sd min max
Chlid’s years of schooling 13.0893 2.1713 9 18
Chlid’s university graduation 0.2452 0.4302 0 1
Mother’s years of schooling 9.7783 2.5953 6 18
Mother’s some college 0.0750 0.2634 0 1
Mother’s university graduation 0.0258 0.1584 0 1
Father’s years of schooling 10.2526 3.1694 6 18
Father’s some college 0.0681 0.2519 0 1
Father’s university graduation 0.1231 0.3286 0 1
Father had a regular job 0.5872 0.4924 0 1
Child was born after 1975 0.0941 0.2920 0 1
Female 0.5406 0.4984 0 1
Notes: This table reports summary statistics of the analysis data. Number of observations is 13,669.
Father had a regular job indicates that the father was an executive of a company or was a regular employee
(joji-koyo no rodosha) when the child was 15 years old.
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Table 4.2: Mean of Child’s Schooling Outcomes by Parent’s Education Level
Mother Father
Chlid’s years Child’s Chlid’s years Child’s
Education level of parent of schooling university of schooling university
Junior high school 12.1753 0.1184 12.1779 0.1179
High school 13.6801 0.3095 13.4729 0.2691
Some college 14.6966 0.5220 14.2095 0.4135
University 15.1222 0.6648 14.8247 0.5639
Notes: This table reports mean schooling outcomes of children by educational level of parents for the
test of the MTR-MTS assumption.
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